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The Future of Testamentary Capacity
Reid Kress Weisbord* & David Horton**
Abstract
Recently, the #FreeBritney saga cast a harsh spotlight on
state guardianship systems. Yet despite their serious flaws,
guardianship regimes have benefited from waves of reform.
Indeed, since the 1970s, most jurisdictions have taken steps to
protect the autonomy of people with cognitive, intellectual, or
developmental disabilities (CIDD). Likewise, lawmakers are
currently experimenting with supported decision-making (SDM):
an alternative to guardianship designed to help individuals with
CIDD make their own choices. These changes are no panacea, but
they have modernized a field that once summarily denied “idiots”
and “lunatics” power over their affairs.
However, in a related context, the legal system’s treatment of
individuals with CIDD remains rooted in the past. Since the
sixteenth century, judges have voided wills executed by owners
who lack testamentary capacity. This Article reveals that this
notoriously problematic rule has resisted the progressive forces
that have swept through guardianship law. The Article then
offers fresh insight into how parties litigate testamentary
capacity claims by reporting the results of a study of 3,449 estates
from California. Finally, the Article analyzes several unsettled
doctrinal issues, such as whether testators have due process
rights to participate in adjudications of their own competence,
the relationship between SDM and will-making, and the
appropriate capacity test for nonprobate transfers.

* Professor of Law and Judge Norma L. Shapiro Scholar, Rutgers Law
School.
** Martin Luther King, Jr. Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis, School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
Recently, Britney Spears became an unlikely spokesperson
for an important cause. Spears was placed under a guardianship
in 2008,1 meaning that a third party—in her case, her father,
James P. Spears—controlled her personal and financial
choices.2 Yet during a hearing on June 23, 2021, Britney
delivered a passionate twenty-three-minute plea for a court to

1. California, where Britney lives, generally uses the term
“conservatorship” for judicially supervised management of property for adults
and married minor children and the term “guardianship” for such
arrangements imposed upon minor children. See CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1510,
1800.3(a) (West 2021). We will use the word “guardianship” as a general term
to describe all arrangements in which a third party acquires the right to
manage a person’s property, but we will focus on the judicially supervised
management of property belonging to adults.
2. See Joe Coscarelli, Britney Spears: ‘I Just Want My Life Back’, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2021), https://perma.cc/HR5M-WWWV (last updated Sept. 22,
2021).
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terminate this arrangement.3 She described how she lost the
freedom to make decisions ranging from the mundane (such as
when to see her friends) to the intimate (like whether to remove
her birth control device and attempt to conceive).4 In addition,
she highlighted the perverse fact that she earns millions of
dollars every year and cannot spend a single penny.5 “I just want
my life back,” she implored.6
Britney’s speech rekindled debate over the American legal
system’s treatment of people with cognitive, intellectual, or
developmental disabilities (CIDD).7 Once, policymakers and
judges dealt with individuals with CIDD as if they “suffered
from a hereditary, incurable disease that led to criminality,
immorality or depraved behavior, and pauperism.”8 The U.S.
Supreme Court articulated this callous perspective in 1872 by
declaring that “a person non compos mentis[] has nothing which
the law recognizes as a mind.”9 Likewise, guardianship hearings
made a mockery of due process10 and tasked the trier of fact with

3. See id.
4. Julia Jacobs & Sarah Bahr, The Britney Spears Transcript,
Annotated: ‘Hear What I Have to Say’, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2021),
https://perma.cc/CJ39-TAKS.
5. Madeline Berg, How Much Has Britney Spears’ Dad Earned
Controlling Her Life?, FORBES (June 24, 2021, 10:28 AM),
https://perma.cc/C3BF-6PKT.
6. Coscarelli, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Robyn M. Powell, From Carrie Buck to Britney Spears:
Strategies for Disrupting the Ongoing Reproductive Oppression of Disabled
People, 107 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 246, 247 (2021); Anna-Drake Stephens,
Student Article, “Don’t You Know That You’re Toxic?” A Look at
Conservatorships Through the #FreeBritney Movement, 45 LAW & PSYCH. REV.
223, 223–24 (2021); Bianca Betancourt, Why Longtime Britney Spears Fans
Are Demanding to #FreeBritney, HARPER’S BAZAAR (Nov. 12, 2021, 5:39 PM),
https://perma.cc/2AK9-9KNA; Ronan Farrow & Jia Tolentino, Britney Spears’s
Conservatorship
Nightmare,
NEW
YORKER
(July
3,
2021),
https://perma.cc/H295-R7NK.
8. Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal
Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 104
(2012).
9. Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. 9, 20 (1872).
10. See, e.g., Dale v. Hahn, 440 F.2d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 1971) (featuring a
plaintiff who alleged that “she did not receive personal notice of [a
guardianship] petition, and also that she was not given an opportunity to
retain counsel, to appear and be heard in opposition to the petition, and to
have a jury trial”).
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deciding whether a respondent was an “idiot” or a “lunatic.”11
Finally, after a guardian was appointed, she engaged in
surrogate decision-making, paternalistically choosing either
what was in the person under guardianship’s best interests or
what the person under guardianship would have done.12
Since then, however, most jurisdictions have updated their
guardianship regimes. The catalyst for these changes was the
recognition that guardianships impose “lifelong constraints
which result in substantial and often unnecessary forfeiture of
rights.”13 For instance, lawmakers have taken steps to ensure
that respondents can participate in guardianship proceedings14
and revamped the black-letter test for incapacity.15 Moreover,
since 2015, eleven states have passed supported
decision-making (SDM) laws.16 SDM statutes replace the norm
of surrogate decision-making with a cooperative model that
“empower[s] persons with disabilities by providing them with
help in making their own decisions, rather than simply
providing someone to make decisions for them.”17 Of course, as
Britney’s story illustrates, guardianship law remains deeply
flawed.18 But at least on paper, the field has “undergone
11. Cooper v. Summers, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 453, 456 (1853).
12. See, e.g., Rasmussen ex rel. Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 688
(Ariz. 1987) (describing these standards).
13. In re Guardianship of Hedin, 528 N.W.2d 567, 573 (Iowa 1995)
(internal quotation omitted).
14. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Carpenter, 66 N.E.3d 272, 277 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2016) (“[A] [person subject to guardianship] has the right to
independent counsel of his or her choice to challenge a guardianship . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., In re Combs, 474 N.Y.S.2d 196, 197 (Surr. Ct. 1984)
(explaining that guardianship statutes once applied to “idiot[s]” and
“lunatic[s]” but now govern individuals who “from any cause whether by age,
disease, affliction or intemperance [have] . . . become incapable of managing
[their] own affairs” (quoting In re Perrine, 5 A. 579, 581 (N.J. Ch. 1886))).
16. See infra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
17. Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable Alternative
to Guardianship, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2013).
18. See, e.g., Rachel Mattingly Phillips, Note, Model Language for
Supported Decision-Making Statutes, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 615, 623 (2020)
(“[R]eforms have also failed to end abuse, as [a] steady drumbeat of press
reports from around the country has confirmed that these deficiencies persist.”
(internal quotation omitted)); Amanda Morris, Britney Spears’s Case Calls
Attention to Wider Questions on Guardianship, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2021),
https://perma.cc/94S9-BCXS (“[A]dvocates for people with disabilities say
guardianships have been used too broadly, including in cases of individuals
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significant procedural and substantive revisions in an effort to
more aptly protect an individual’s rights, autonomy and
self-determination.”19
This Article explores a related issue that has received less
attention. Under the ancient doctrine of testamentary capacity,
courts strike down wills executed by testators who lack a “sound
mind.”20 Capacity contests and guardianship proceedings are
two sides of the same coin: both seek to determine whether “a
state legitimately may intrude into an individual’s affairs and
take action to limit an individual’s rights to make decisions
about his or her own . . . property.”21 Yet the law of
testamentary capacity has not kept pace with guardianship
reforms.22 For example, states have given respondents in
guardianship proceedings robust due process protections,
including the right to appear at the hearing.23 Conversely, under
the “worst evidence” tradition, judges must adjudicate a
testator’s capacity after she passes away.24 Likewise, under

with psychiatric disorders and developmental or intellectual disabilities who,
the advocates say, do not require such intense or continuous oversight.”).
19. Brief of Texas Advocates et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 9, In re Tonner, 513 S.W.3d 496 (Tex. 2016) (No. 14-0940), 2015 WL 374580,
at *9 (Tex. Jan. 26, 2015).
20. See Statute of Wills (1572 amendments), 34 and 35 Henry VIII, ch. 5,
§ 14 (voiding wills made by “idiot[s]” or “any person de non sane memory”). In
addition, courts invalidate bequests that are the product of an “insane
delusion”: a persistent false belief. See Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Completely
Insane Law of Partial Insanity: The Impact of Monomania on Testamentary
Capacity, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 67, 68 (2007). However, this Article
only deals with the discrete issue of general testamentary capacity.
21. Charles P. Sabatino & Erica Wood, The Conceptualization of Capacity
of Older Persons in Western Law, in BEYOND ELDER LAW: NEW DIRECTIONS IN
LAW AND AGING 35, 36 (2012).
22. See Pamela Champine, Expertise and Instinct in the Assessment of
Testamentary Capacity, 51 VILL. L. REV. 25, 93 (2006) (observing that
“[t]estamentary capacity law [has] stagnated for the entirety of the twentieth
century”).
23. Rebekah Diller, Legal Capacity for All: Including Older Persons in the
Shift from Adult Guardianship to Supported Decision-Making, 43 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 495, 505 (2016) (noting that lawmakers and courts have “imported
due process into guardianship proceedings and mandated that an individual’s
rights could not be taken away without a hearing”).
24. See John C.P. Goldberg & Robert H. Sitkoff, Torts and Estates:
Remedying Wrongful Interference with Inheritance, 65 STAN. L. REV. 335, 344
(2013).
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guardianship law’s “least restrictive alternative” principle,
courts try to preserve the freedom of a person under a
guardianship to the greatest extent possible.25 But in most
jurisdictions, this norm does not extend to will-making. Indeed,
under the nondelegation doctrine, guardians and agents acting
under powers of attorney cannot make a proxy will for a
testator.26 Thus, wills law has resisted the progressive spirit
that has swept through the field of guardianships.
To make these points concrete, the Article uses a
hand-collected dataset of 3,449 probate administrations from
two counties in California. It finds that an average of nearly four
years passed between the execution of the will—the crucial date
for assessing the testator’s capacity27—and the filing of
litigation. As a result, postponing trials until after the testator’s
death forces factfinders to rely on fading witness memories and
exhibits that have been gathering dust. Moreover, despite this
evidentiary haze, contestants fared well on the merits. Taking
advantage of a California statute that requires probate courts to
approve most settlement agreements, we find that litigants in
capacity cases received a mean of 58 percent of the value of their
claims.28 Thus, testamentary capacity has the potential to
reorder an estate plan.
The Article then examines open questions about
testamentary capacity. For starters, it considers whether some
of the constitutional principles that inspired guardianship
reforms also require states to reconsider the worst evidence
approach. Specifically, the Article explains that there is a
25. See UNIF. GUARDIANSHIP, CONSERVATORSHIP & OTHER PROTECTIVE
ARRANGEMENTS ACT § 301(b) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (“The court may not
establish a full guardianship if a limited guardianship, protective
arrangement instead of guardianship, or other less restrictive alternatives
would meet the needs of the respondent.”); Jamie L. Leary, Note, A Review of
Two Recently Reformed Guardianship Statutes: Balancing the Need to Protect
Individuals Who Cannot Protect Themselves Against the Need to Guard
Individual Autonomy, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 245, 263–65 (1997) (describing
the origins of the principle).
26. See Ralph C. Brashier, The Ghostwritten Will, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1803,
1811 (2013) [hereinafter Brashier, Ghostwritten] (“No one can make, amend,
or revoke the will of another person, and this is so even when that person
becomes incapacitated and unable to act for herself.”).
27. See Atchison v. Lewis, 38 A.2d 673, 673 (Conn. 1944) (applying the
“test of testamentary capacity . . . at the very time he execute[d]” the will).
28. See infra notes 207–211 and accompanying text.
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glimmer of an argument that the Due Process Clause entitles
testators to litigate capacity claims during their lives. In
addition, the Article analyzes what the SDM movement means
for will-making. It concludes that the nondelegation doctrine
should not bar supporters from assisting testators with drafting
and signing wills. It also evaluates arguments both for and
against treating the SDM process to be “capacity-boosting”—a
method for testators who normally would lack capacity to
execute valid wills. Finally, the Article suggests doctrinal
changes that would modernize the black-letter testamentary
capacity rule.
Three additional points deserve mention at the outset.
First, testamentary capacity is worth revisiting because
America is undergoing a massive demographic shift. Currently,
about 50 million people are age 65 or older.29 By 2060, that
number will rise to roughly 95 million,30 and members of that
cohort will enjoy average life expectancies of an additional 19.5
years.31 Because a third of seniors will suffer from Alzheimer’s
or dementia,32 “the likelihood is increasing that, at some point,
an attorney will be called upon to help a client or a client’s family
deal with the challenges posed by incapacity.”33
Second, although we compare guardianship hearings and
capacity contests, we acknowledge that they are not identical.
For one, the stakes diverge. A guardianship can deprive a person
of liberty interests, including the power to “choose where they
live, how they spend their money, with whom they spend their
time, and with whom they have relationships.”34 By contrast, a
successful capacity claim merely voids a will. Likewise, courts
assess the capacity of the living and the dead differently. Judges
“require substantial proof of general incapacity before a

29. ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING, 2018 PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS 1
(2018), https://perma.cc/J2YM-JP5L (PDF).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Facts and Figures, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, https://perma.cc/H84L73L7.
33. KATHLEEN A. KADYSZEWSKI, PLANNING FOR INCAPACITY AND DISABILITY,
BASIC ESTATE PLANNING IN FLORIDA § 3.1 (10th ed. 2020).
34. Diller, supra note 23, at 501–02 (internal citations omitted).
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guardianship is granted.”35 Conversely, the degree of acuity
needed to create a valid will “is exceptionally low.”36 In fact, one
“need not have sufficient mental capacity to enter into complex
contracts or engage in intricate business in order to have
sufficient capacity to make a will.”37 Lastly, the state’s interest
in imposing a guardianship is crystal clear: such an
arrangement prevents people with CIDD from making unwise
choices that jeopardize their own welfare.38 But “few courts or
scholars have ever explained why a testator’s mental
competency is an appropriate prerequisite to a validly executed
will.”39 Indeed, “common sense tells us a living person will not
35. James Toomey, How to End Our Stories: A Study of the Perspectives
of Seniors on Dementia and Decision-Making, 29 ELDER L.J. 1, 22 (2021).
Admittedly, courts do not always obey this command in practice. See id. (“[T]he
paternalistic view that guardianship principally benefits the ward, ‘has made
a judicial determination of incapacity relatively easy to obtain, particularly
where the proposed ward has been an old person.’” (quoting 18 AM. JUR. 3d
PROOF OF FACTS 185 § 5 (2020))).
36. In re Marriage of Greenway, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 364, 374 (Ct. App.
2013). Indeed, “[m]erely being an older person, possessing a failing memory,
momentary forgetfulness, weakness of mental powers or lack of strict
coherence in conversation does not render one incapable [of making a will].”
Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 456 (Ky. 1998); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1 cmt. d (AM. L. INST.
2003) (“Because an irrevocable gift depletes financial resources that the donor
may yet need, the standard for mental capacity to make an irrevocable gift is
higher than that for making a will.”).
37. In re Chongas’ Est., 202 P.2d 711, 713 (Utah 1949).
38. See, e.g., In re S.P., 788 A.2d 10, 12 (Vt. 2001) (“The purpose of a
guardianship, as its name suggests, is to lawfully invest a person with the
authority and duty to protect and take care of another person.”).
39. Mary Louise Fellows, The Case Against Living Probate, 78 MICH. L.
REV. 1066, 1109 (1980). This is not to say that commentators have ignored the
doctrine’s flaws. See Champine, supra note 22, at 93 (arguing that the doctrine
should encourage potentially incapacitated testators to undergo forensic
assessments during life); Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and
the Unexpressed Major Premise, 53 YALE L.J. 271, 306–07 (1944) (studying fact
patterns in incapacity cases and concluding that “in determining the issue of
mental incompetency, more frequently than otherwise, courts are passing
upon the abnormality of the transaction rather than on the ability of the
alleged incompetent to understand the transaction”); Milton D. Green,
Judicial Tests of Mental Incompetency, 6 MO. L. REV. 141, 165 (1941)
[hereinafter Green, Judicial Tests] (contending that “[t]he standard by which
mental incompetency is determined by the courts is a purely subjective one
[that] . . . has no referent in the outside world”); James Toomey, Narrative
Capacity, 100 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 43–52),
https://perma.cc/AUN8-R87M (offering a thoughtful proposal that courts
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be harmed by his or her own testamentary documents.”40 We
will try to be sensitive to these distinctions.
Third, we should clarify our vocabulary. We intend “CIDD”
to be a catchall category that includes any reason that a court
might question a person’s ability to make legally binding
decisions, including diseases such as dementia, psycho-social
conditions like schizophrenia, and acquired disabilities
stemming from trauma. In addition, we will refer to
“respondents” and “persons under a guardianship” rather than
using the archaic phrases “protected persons” or “wards.”41
Finally, following the convention of many courts, we will use the
words “competency” and “capacity” interchangeably even
though these two concepts are not the same.42 Competency is a
legal determination made by a judge about whether to permit a
person to make a particular decision or hold her accountable for
her actions.43 Competency is binary: it either exists or it does
not.44 Capacity, by contrast, is a medical decision “and is best
understood as existing on a continuum—capacity can range
from high to average to low.”45 Despite this distinction,
discussions of mental fitness in the law usually employ
“capacity” to mean “competency”: a judicial decision about “the
ability of an individual to make autonomous decisions that are
sufficiently valid.”46 We will do the same.

replace the testamentary capacity rule with a new standard that examines
whether a will reflects a coherent narrative based on the testator’s life).
40. Greenway, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 376; see Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and
the Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 302 (2017) (noting that “once they have
died, testators’ wellbeing no longer merits concern by the state”).
41. See Third National Guardianship Summit: Standards and
Recommendations, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1191, 1199 (2012) (“Where possible, the
term person under guardianship should replace terms such as incapacitated
person, ward, or disabled person.”).
42. See Phillips, supra note 18, at 616 (noting that “in reality, the terms
are often used interchangeably”).
43. See id. at 616–17 (defining legal competency).
44. See Julie Blaskewicz Boron, Cognitive Competence and
Decision-Making Capacity, 53 CREIGHTON L. REV. 659, 660 (2020).
45. Phillips, supra note 18, at 616.
46. Catherine S. Shaffer et. al., A Conceptual Framework for Thinking
About Physician-Assisted Death for Persons with a Mental Disorder, 22 PSYCH.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 141, 157 n.6 (2016).
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The Article contains four Parts. Part I explores the
revolution in guardianship law. It reveals that states once
routinely violated the rights of people with CIDD but are now
trying to repair their broken systems. Part II explores the
history of testamentary capacity doctrine. It explains that the
rule crystalized more than 200 years ago in a long-lost case in
which a sitting U.S. Supreme Court Justice presided over a New
Jersey will contest. Since then, however, it has divided courts
and fallen out of step with the disability rights movement. Part
III offers a ground-level view of testamentary incapacity claims
by studying three years of court records from California. Among
other things, it discovers that these allegations are typically
litigated years after the execution of the will and generate
generous settlements. Part IV looks to the future by considering
the relationship between due process and the worst evidence
tradition, the interplay of SDM and estate planning, and
unsettled issues about the formulation and scope of the
testamentary capacity standard.
I.

CAPACITY DURING LIFE

This Part describes the guardianship system: the process by
which courts decide whether a living person lacks the ability to
make gifts, sign contracts, manage her finances, and make other
important choices. It explains that after decades of neglect, most
states have overhauled their guardianship regimes, and several
are also now experimenting with the cutting-edge alternative of
SDM.
Guardianships emanate from the ancient principle of
“parens patriae”: the idea that the state sometimes acts to
“protect[] . . . those unable to care for themselves.”47 For
example, in the 1200s, the British Parliament passed a statute
called De Praerogativa Regis, which entrusted the Monarch with
tending to the less fortunate:
The King, as the political father and guardian of his
kingdom, has the protection of all his subjects, and of their
land and goods; and he is bound, in a more peculiar manner,
to take care of those who, by reason of their imbecility or

47. Bd. of Comm’rs v. McGuinness, 80 N.E.3d 164, 170 (Ind. 2017)
(quoting Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1287 (10th ed. 2014)).
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want of understanding, are incapable of taking care of
themselves.48

Juries determined whether a person was an “idiot,” who
was “born mentally deficient,” or a “lunatic,” who was “subject
to fits of madness, with lucid intervals in between.”49 If someone
fell into one of these categories, the court would appoint a
committee to handle her property.50
In the 1800s, American jurisdictions codified these norms
in guardianship laws. These statutes allowed third parties to
petition probate courts to appoint someone to manage the assets
of “persons who, by reason of their insanity, imbecility, or
habitual drunkenness, are mentally incompetent.”51 They were
backstopped by civil commitment mechanisms, which placed
individuals with severe mental health disorders in specialized
hospitals.52
At first, the legal system was ambivalent about
guardianships. Some lawmakers and courts recognized that
guardians “exercised virtually total control over the [person
48. LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING
LUNATICS, IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 6 (1833).
49. Comment, Lunacy and Idiocy—The Old Law and Its Incubus, 18 U.
CHI. L. REV. 361, 361–62 (1951); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *303 (“By the old common law there is a writ de idiota
inquierendo, to inquire whether a man be an idiot or not . . . which must be
tried by a jury of twelve men . . . .”).
50. See 1 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 475 (1923)
(describing the process by which “the Chancellor appoints the committee for
the lunatic, and is under the duty of seeing that the committee duly
administers the lunatic’s property”). Profits from managing real property
owned by “idiots” flowed to the King, “while those from a lunatic’s land had to
be returned to him when he came ‘to right mind.’” John J. Regan, Protective
Services for the Elderly: Commitment, Guardianship, and Alternatives, 13 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 569, 570 (1972).
51. Kellogg v. Cochran, 25 P. 677, 678 (Cal. 1890); see also Thompson v.
Hall, 77 Me. 160, 164 (1885) (involving a letter from a “friend” of a person
under a guardianship seeking to name a new guardian after the existing one
refused to serve); Margaret K. Krasik, The Lights of Science and Experience:
Historical Perspectives on Legal Attitudes Toward the Role of Medical
Expertise in Guardianship of the Elderly, 33 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 201, 207 (1989)
(describing an 1836 Pennsylvania statute).
52. See David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, Social Policy Toward
Intellectual Disabilities in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, in THE
HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 83, 84– 85
(2003) (describing the rise of asylums in the mid-1800s).
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under guardianship’s] life.”53 As a result, some early
guardianship legislation gave allegedly impaired individuals “a
right to a jury, adequate notice as necessary, and the
opportunity to examine witnesses and be examined as in any
other suit.”54 Likewise, even when a statute did not confer these
entitlements, some judges implied them.55 For example, in
North v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge,56 Eliza North was an
eighty-four-year-old widow who “had always managed her own
business[] and was abundantly capable of doing so.”57 A probate
court placed her under a guardianship without giving her notice
of the proceeding.58 The Michigan Supreme Court reversed,
remarking that “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more flagrant
violation of the law.”59
Yet there was also a countervailing intellectual current.
Some judges thought that disempowering persons with CIDD
also benefited them. For instance, in 1853, the New York Court
of Appeals opined that a guardianship was in a respondent’s
best interest because it ensured that her property would not be
“wasted [or] destroyed.”60 According to this logic, because
guardianship hearings were benevolent attempts to help

53. Glen, supra note 8, at 105–06.
54. A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where Is the Constitutional Crisis
with Procedural Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?,
7 ELDER L.J. 33, 53 (1999).
55. See, e.g., Chase v. Hathaway, 14 Mass. 222, 224 (1817) (reasoning that
“every citizen shall be maintained in the enjoyment of his liberty and property,
unless he has . . . had opportunity to answer such charges as, according to
those laws, will justify a forfeiture or suspension of them”); Holman v. Holman,
13 A. 576, 576 (Me. 1888) (“[I]t is a well-settled rule of the common law that,
when an adjudication is to be made which will seriously affect the rights of a
person, he should be notified, and have an opportunity to be heard.”); Jones v.
Learned, 66 P. 1071, 1072 (Colo. App. 1902) (“This section did not, in terms,
require notice to be served upon the lunatic. The authorities, however, are at
one that such notice is necessary irrespective of statute.”).
56. 26 N.W. 810 (Mich. 1886).
57. Id. at 811.
58. See id. at 813.
59. Id. at 819.
60. Wadsworth v. Sharpsteen, 8 N.Y. 388, 391 (1853) (granting a petition
for guardianship).
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impaired individuals, robust due process protections were
superfluous.61
Then, in the early twentieth century, social Darwinism
came into vogue, and concern for the autonomy of people under
a guardianship evaporated.62 Despite advances in psychiatry,63
jurisdictions clung to anachronistic statutes that imposed
guardianships on “idiot[s]” and “imbecile[s].”64 Likewise, in
1901, the Supreme Court significantly weakened respondents’
due process rights in Simon v. Craft.65 A friend of Jetta Simon,
a forty-nine-year-old widow, filed a petition to place her under a
guardianship.66 Rather than serve Simon with notice, the sheriff
arrested her on the advice of a local doctor who said that “it
would not be consistent with her health or safety to have her
present in court in any matter now pending.”67 In Simon’s
absence, the jury found her to be a “lunatic,” and the guardian
eventually sold her home over her objection.68 The Court held
that the guardianship hearing satisfied the requirements of
procedural due process because Simon had received notice of the
petition and a guardian ad litem had opposed it on her behalf.69
By the late twentieth century, the guardianship system had
devolved into a kangaroo court. Thirteen percent of respondents
never received notice that someone had filed a petition to subject
61. See Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who from What, and Why, and
How?: A Proposal for an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective Proceedings,
12 ELDER L.J. 53, 59–60 (2004).
62. David L. Braddock & Susan L. Parish, An Institutional History of
Disability, in DISABILITY STUDIES AS A FIELD 11, 38 (Gary L. Albrect et al. eds.,
2001); cf. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927) (infamously upholding a
Virginia law that permitted the “sterilization of mental defectives” because
“[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough”).
63. See Krasik, supra note 51, at 210–12 (describing the birth of
psychiatry in the 1800s).
64. Sheryl Dicker, Guardianship: Overcoming the Last Hurdle to Civil
Rights for the Mentally Disabled, 4 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 485, 490
(1981); Comment, Appointment of Guardians for the Mentally Incompetent,
1964 DUKE L.J. 341, 342–44 (1964) (describing courts’ early approaches to
bases for guardianship).
65. 182 U.S. 427 (1901).
66. See id. at 428.
67. Id. at 428–29.
68. See Craft v. Simon, 24 So. 380, 383 (Ala. 1898) (affirming the
guardianship and the sale of Simon’s residence).
69. Simon, 182 U.S. at 436–47.
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them to a guardianship.70 Half of these individuals were not
represented by counsel.71 A quarter of cases were decided
without a hearing,72 93 percent of respondents did not set foot
in court,73 and many proceedings lasted a mere fifteen
minutes.74 Finally, judges sometimes imposed guardianships
based on nothing more than a declaration from a doctor who had
neither treated the respondent nor was available to be
cross-examined.75 Thus, the process had become dehumanizing
and mechanized.
But in the 1970s, the pendulum began to swing in the other
direction. Activists succeeded in replacing the “medical” model
of disability (which conceptualized disability as “a condition to
be treated and cured”)76 with the “social model” (which recast
disability as a kind of discrimination).77 The social model sought
70. Mark D. Andrews, Note, The Elderly in Guardianship: A Crisis of
Constitutional Proportions, 5 ELDER L.J. 75, 81 (1997).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See George J. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Different Perspective
on Guardianship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1010 (1979).
74. See PAMELA B. TEASTER ET AL., WARDS OF THE STATE: A NATIONAL
STUDY OF PUBLIC GUARDIANSHIP 16 (2005) (summarizing research finding that
“the majority of hearings lasted no more than fifteen minutes and 25% of
hearings lasted less than five minutes”).
75. See Dicker, supra note 64, at 492–93 (explaining that in Arkansas,
the written statement of a doctor suffices as sole evidence to determine
incompetence); Note, The Disguised Oppression of Involuntary Guardianship:
Have the Elderly Freedom to Spend?, 73 YALE L.J. 676, 680 (1964)
(“Psychiatrists rarely testify at guardianship [proceedings].”). For more on the
dilution of due process, see Wright, supra note 61, at 59 (observing that states
“failed to require adequate notice and opportunity for hearing to respondents,
failed to apply uniformly the rules of evidence and civil procedure, failed to
appoint counsel for respondents, [and] failed to provide for the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses”); In re Link, 713 S.W.2d 487, 493 (Mo.
1986) (explaining that hearings took place “an atmosphere of procedural
informality”); In re Evatt, 722 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Ark. 1987) (describing
guardianship process that “does not contain a meaningful notice provision”
and “does not provide the ward with the right to be present at a subsequent
hearing where he can have counsel and cross-examine those who caused him
to lose his freedom or control over his property, or both”).
76. Karen Andreasian et al., Revisiting S.C.P.A 17-A: Guardianship for
People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 18 CUNY L. REV. 287,
296 (2015).
77. See Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CALIF. L. REV.
75, 85 (2007) (“The social model of disability asserts that contingent social
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to eradicate barriers that prevented people with disabilities
from participating in everyday life—a goal that eventually
inspired Congress to pass the Americans with Disabilities Act.78
This shift made the guardianship system seem woefully
inadequate. Commentators criticized states for providing “only
limited due process safeguards[] and impos[ing] sweeping
restrictions on [impaired] people without regard to less drastic
alternatives.”79 In 1987, the Associated Press published a
blockbuster exposé documenting how badly the system was
broken.80 A year later, Congress held hearings in which Claude
Pepper, the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Aging,
famously quipped that “[t]he typical [person under a
guardianship] has fewer rights than the typical convicted
felon.”81
conditions rather than inherent biological limitations constrain individuals’
abilities and create a disability category.”); David A. Weisbach, Toward a New
Approach to Disability Law, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 47, 47–48 (2009)
(explaining that under the social model, “disabilities are caused by the
constructed environment . . . and that it is society’s ethical or moral duty to
change that environment to provide equal access and equal functioning to all
its members”). Of course, this is not to say that disability scholars speak with
a single voice. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114
YALE L.J. 1, 7 (2004) (noting that “the disability rights movement . . . embraces
people with a range of different disabilities, different life experiences, different
material needs, and different ideological perspectives”); Jasmine E. Harris,
The Aesthetics of Disability, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 926 (2019) (challenging
the idea that integrating people with disabilities into society helps eliminate
discrimination against them).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (“The Congress finds that . . . physical or
mental disabilities in no way diminish a person’s right to fully participate in
all aspects of society, yet many people with physical or mental disabilities have
been precluded from doing so because of discrimination.”).
79. Stanley S. Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for Mentally
Retarded Persons, 31 STAN. L. REV. 553, 606 (1979); see also Comment, An
Assessment of the Pennsylvania Estate Guardianship Incompetency Standard,
124 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1078 (1976) (emphasizing that “[a] declaration of civil
incompetency resulting in a guardianship of the estate is a very serious
matter, having drastic legal, social, and psychological effects for a person
declared incompetent”).
80. See Fred Bayles, Guardians of the Elderly: An Ailing System Part I:
Declared ‘Legally Dead’ by a Troubled System, AP (Sept. 19, 1987),
https://perma.cc/U9VG-59K4 (noting, among many other things, that “[s]ome
elderly people discover they are wards of the court only after the fact”).
81. THE CHAIRMAN OF SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE,
REPORT ON ABUSES IN GUARDIANSHIP OF THE ELDERLY AND INFIRM: A NATIONAL
DISGRACE, 100th Cong., H.R. DOC. NO. 100-640, at 4 (1987).
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States responded by revamping their guardianship
statutes. For example, in 1988, about 100 guardianship bills
were introduced into twenty-eight state legislatures.82 Before
long, nearly every state in the union had overhauled its
guardianship regime.83 For one, lawmakers replaced the vague
nineteenth-century standards for determining incapacity with
“functional assessment[s] of the person’s ability to make
decisions.”84 In addition, under the “least restrictive alternative”
principle, courts tried to “allow[] incapacitated persons to retain
as much autonomy as possible.”85 For example, plenary
guardianships, which flatly deny people under guardianships
the power to make decisions, were once the norm.86 Increasingly,
though, courts opted for limited guardianships, which only

82. See Johns, supra note 54, at 46.
83. See, e.g., ABA, STATE ADULT GUARDIANSHIP LEGISLATION SUMMARY
26– 31 (2019), https://perma.cc/KTU9-GLBD (PDF) (providing a table of
guardianship reforms by jurisdiction).
84. Diller, supra note 23, at 505. These laws predicate incapacity on two
findings: (1) that the person suffers from a “disabling condition”; and (2) that
this ailment makes her unable “to adequately manage [her] personal or
financial affairs.” Sabatino & Wood, supra note 21, at 37; cf. UNIF.
GUARDIANSHIP & PROTECTIVE PROCEED. ACT § 401(2)(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N 1997)
(defining incapacity to manage property as “an impairment in the ability to
receive and evaluate information or make decisions, even with the use of
appropriate technological assistance”); CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(b) (West 2021)
(“A guardian of the estate may be appointed for a person who is substantially
unable to manage his or her own financial resources or resist fraud or undue
influence . . . .”); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 81.02 (McKinney 2021) (authorizing
guardianship of the property for persons “unable to provide for personal needs
and/or property management and [where] the person cannot adequately
understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of such inability”). In
a related development, courts held that “because a finding of incompetency
involves deprivation of an individual’s exercise of liberty and property rights,
a determination of incompetency . . . must be established through clear and
convincing evidence.” State ex rel. Shamblin v. Collier, 445 S.E.2d 736, 741
(1994); see also UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-311 (amended 2019) (adopting the clear
and convincing evidence standard for the appointment of a guardian); In re
Conservatorship of Edelman, 448 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989)
(denying a petition to establish a conservatorship of estate because the
petitioner did not establish that the person under a guardianship was
incapacitated by clear and convincing evidence).
85. In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003).
86. See Kohn et al., supra note 17, at 1116 n.6.
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restrict certain kinds of choices.87 Finally, lawmakers gave
respondents the rights to be represented by counsel, to confront
adverse witnesses, to demand a jury, and to request an inquiry
by a court-appointed investigator.88
When legislatures did not act, courts stepped in. After the
Supreme Court held that draconian civil commitment rules
were unconstitutional, plaintiffs filed a wave of challenges to
guardianship practices.89 These cases established that
respondents have the right to participate in adjudications of
their own competence. For example, in In re Guardianship of
Deere,90 Archie Deere received notice that a guardianship
proceeding had been scheduled for the following week.91 On the
eve of the hearing, he found a lawyer who was willing to
represent him.92 Although neither Deere nor his attorney could
appear on short notice, the court denied his request for a
continuance and appointed a guardian for Deere.93 The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma reversed the order, reasoning that “minimal
due process requires proper written notice and a hearing at
87. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-401 cmt. (amended 2019) (encouraging
courts “to appoint a limited conservator whenever possible”); Kohn et al., supra
note 17, at 1116 n.6 (explaining how limited guardianships work).
88. See Glen, supra note 8, at 109, 113–14.
89. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730, 738 (1972) (finding that
Indiana’s approach to civil commitment for criminal defendants was
unconstitutional); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 568 (1975) (holding
that “a State cannot constitutionally confine . . . a nondangerous individual
who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of
willing and responsible family members or friends”). Lower courts issued
similar opinions. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. Carlson, 377 F. Supp. 896, 903–04 (D.
Conn. 1974), rev’d on other grounds, 520 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1975) (striking
down a Connecticut law that charged certain prisoners fees while they were
patients at mental hospitals); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361,
1368 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (invalidating a Pennsylvania statute that allowed “the
Commonwealth . . . to summarily seize and appropriate assets of a patient not
adjudged incompetent, while having to provide notice and opportunity for a
hearing to a patient adjudged incompetent”). Courts were somewhat slow to
find that guardianships deprived those persons under the guardianships of
property interests because of the entrenched view that those proceedings
“preserv[ed] the property” of the person subject to guardianship. Alexander,
supra note 73, at 1012–13 (1979) (emphasis added).
90. 708 P.2d 1123 (Okla. 1985).
91. Id. at 1124.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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which the alleged incompetent may appear to present evidence
in his/her own behalf.”94 Accordingly, whether through statute
or judicial decree, almost every state has now created due
process protections for respondents.95
More recently, supported decision-making (SDM) has
gained momentum in statehouses across the country.
Traditionally, guardians made choices either by deciding what
was in a person with CIDD’s best interests or by applying a
substituted judgment standard and asking what the individual
would have done if she possessed capacity.96 But in 2006, the
94. Id. at 1126; see also In re Evatt, 722 S.W.2d 851, 852–53 (Ark. 1987)
(striking down a state statute that permitted courts to impose temporary
guardianship without notice or “the right to be present at a subsequent
hearing where he can have counsel and cross-examine those who caused him
to lose his freedom or control over his property, or both”); In re Kloster, 526 So.
2d 196, 196 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that trial court violated a person
under a guardianship’s due process rights by refusing to hear expert testimony
about her “physical ability to take care of herself”); Guardianship of Doe, 463
N.E.2d 339, 341, 344 (Mass. 1984) (invalidating a guardianship when the
person under the guardianship “was not notified of this proceeding either
before or after her commitment”); In re Gamble, 394 A.2d 308, 310 (N.H. 1978)
(determining that due process prohibits judges from both nominating a
guardian and deciding whether that person is fit to serve); In re Weingarten,
405 N.Y.S.2d 605, 607 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (denying motion for appointment of
guardian where “the Notice of Motion was not served personally upon [the
ward]” because “due process requires that she be given an opportunity to be
heard”). But see Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 1978)
(“[N]otwithstanding the significant liberty interests implicated in an
incompetency proceeding, we are unpersuaded that the presence of counsel is
an essential element of due process at such a proceeding.”).
95. See Desiree C. Hensley, Due Process Is Not Optional: Mississippi
Guardianship Proceedings Fall Short on Basic Due Process Protections for
Elderly and Disabled Adults, 86 MISS. L.J. 715, 719–20 (2017) (“[N]early every
state ultimately adopted revisions to its guardian and conservatorship laws to
enhance procedural protections . . . .”).
96. See, e.g., Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the
Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1, 32 n.170 (1990) (discussing
the origins of the “best interests” standard); Dilip V. Jeste et al., Supported
Decision Making in Serious Mental Illness, 81 PSYCHIATRY 28, 31 (2018) (“Most
state laws [provide] that a substituted judgment standard should guide
guardian decision making, and a best interest standard is allowable when
guardians lack sufficient evidence to determine what decision the ward would
have made if she or he had the capacity.”); Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A.
Frolik, Surrogate Decision-Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and
Reality, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1491, 1495–96 (2012) (surveying states and finding
wide variation in whether they use best interests, substituted judgment, or a
combination of both).

THE FUTURE OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

627

United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities assailed these forms of surrogate decision-making
by declaring that countries needed to “provide access by persons
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising
their legal capacity.”97 Nine years later, Texas became the first
American jurisdiction to pass a SDM statute.98 Since then,
Alaska, Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Indiana,
Louisiana, Nevada, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Washington,
and Wisconsin have followed suit.99
The idea behind SDM “is as old as decision-making
itself.”100 People often consult with their friends and family
when facing important choices.101 SDM laws harness this
collaborative approach to encourage people with CIDD to control
their own destinies. SDM statutes provide a framework for
principals to enter into agreements with “supporters,” who help
the principal acquire information, process it, and communicate
her choices.102 In addition, they provide that third parties must
respect decisions that arise from this process.103 Although SDM
legislation is embryonic and suffers from crucial ambiguities—a
point to which we will return in Part IV—it nevertheless marks
“a paradigm shift” that “upends the conventional wisdom that
individuals with cognitive challenges need to be ‘protected’ from

97. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities §§ 2–3, opened
for signature Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3. The United States has signed but
not ratified the Convention. See Eliana J. Theodorou, Note, Supported
Decision-Making in the Lone-Star State, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 978 (2018).
98. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.001 (West 2021).
99. See generally ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.010 (2021); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 15-14-801 (2022); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9401a (2021); D.C. CODE § 7-2131
(2021); IND. CODE § 29-3-14-1 (2021); LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:4261.101 (2021); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 162c.010 (2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36-01 (2021); 42 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-66.13-5 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.130.001 (2021); WIS. STAT.
§ 52.01 (2021).
100. Phillips, supra note 18, at 616 n. 8.
101. See Diller, supra note 23, at 516 (“[W]e all turn to supporters to assist
us in making decisions—whether we ask advice, seek explanations, or
designate someone to interface with an agency on our behalf.”).
102. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 1357.002 (3)–(5) (West 2021).
103. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.130 (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16
§ 9407A (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 162C.310 (2021).
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making poor decisions by having a surrogate decision-maker
appointed to make decisions for them.”104
To conclude, in the last half-century, states have begun to
take the rights of people with CIDD more seriously. But as we
discuss next, there has been less progress in the analogous
context of testamentary capacity.
II.

TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

Guardianships are not the only proceedings in which courts
evaluate a property owner’s mental acuity. Judges also require
testators to have sufficient capacity to execute a valid will.105
This Part surveys the past and present of testamentary
capacity. It reveals that the doctrine’s policy basis and
black-letter elements have long been hazy, and that the rule has
largely been impervious to recent changes in disability law.
A.

The “Sound Mind” Standard

English law formally adopted the doctrine of testamentary
capacity in 1572, when Parliament amended the Statute of Wills
to annul instruments executed “by any . . . idiot or, by any
person de non sane memory.”106 Eventually, lawmakers
replaced these phrases by requiring testators to be “of
sound . . . mind.”107 Very roughly, this meant that testators
needed to be able to identify their assets and beneficiaries when
they executed the document.108

104.

Nina A. Kohn, Legislating Supported Decision-Making, 58 HARV. J.
313, 319 (2021).
105. See infra Part II.A–B.
106. See Statute of Wills (1572 amendments), 34 and 35 Henry VIII, ch. 5,
§ 14. Records from Ancient Greece also suggest that mental capacity has long
been grounds to nullify a will. See Anton-Hermann Chroust, Estate Planning
in Hellenic Antiquity: Aristotle’s Last Will and Testament, 45 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 629, 637 (1970).
107. Greenwood v. Greenwood [1790] 163 Eng. Rep. 930, 931 (KB).
108. Id. at 943 (explaining that a testator must possess the “power of
summoning up his mind so as to know what his property was, and who those
persons were that then were the objects of his bounty”); see also Harwood v.
Baker [1840] 13 Eng. Rep. 117 (PC) (“[The testator] must also have capacity
to comprehend . . . the nature of the claims of others, whom, by his Will, he is
excluding from all participation in that property.”); Marquess of Winchester’s
Case [1598] 3 Coke’s Reps. 302, 302 (KB) (explaining that the testator “ought
ON LEGIS.
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However, the “sound mind” test proved easier to recite than
to apply. For one, courts struggled to distinguish a disqualifying
mental impairment from mere benign eccentricity. As one
English chancellor explained:
There is no difficulty in the case of a raving madman or of a
drivelling [sic] idiot, in saying that he is not a person capable
of disposing of property. But between such an extreme case
and that of a man of perfectly sound and vigorous
understanding, there is every shade of intellect, every degree
of mental capacity. There is no possibility of mistaking
midnight for noon; but at what precise moment twilight
becomes darkness is hard to determine.109

Similarly, judges disagreed about the significance of
delusions that were not related to the will. For instance, in
Waring v. Waring,110 the testator harbored romantic fantasies
about her servants and a chronic unfounded fear of
assassination.111 But at the same time, “in matters relating to
the care of her property, [she] conducted herself with great
prudence and discretion, and apparently as a person of sound
mind.”112 The court admitted that “mere eccentricity is not
enough to constitute mental unsoundness,”113 but nevertheless
held that the testator was “undoubtedly insane” and a
“lunatic.”114 Conversely, in Banks v. Goodfellow,115 the Court of
Queen’s Bench upheld a will executed by a testator who suffered
from paranoid schizophrenia because his condition did not affect

to have a disposing memory so as to be able to make a disposition of his estate
with understanding and reason”).
109. Boyse v. Rossborough [1857] 10 Eng. Rep. 1192, 1210 (HL).
110. [1848] 13 Eng. Rep. 715 (PC).
111. See id. at 715–16, 722–23, 725. The court summarized the following
evidence of the testator’s behavior: “[S]he entertained (though without any
rational foundation) a suspicion that her husband was endeavouring
fraudulently to obtain her property and to poison her; that . . . her relations
and friends, including her brother . . . appeared to her in disguise,
[and] . . . she would frequently fire off pistols at night.” Id. at 716–17.
112. Id. at 725.
113. Id. at 720.
114. Id. at 721 (explaining that it is “wholly immaterial that [the testator’s
delusions] do not appear in the Will itself”).
115.
LR 5 QB 549 (1870).
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his ability to “understand the nature of the act” of
will-making.116
Compounding this confusion, the policy basis for
testamentary capacity was elusive. As noted above, courts
justify guardianships on the grounds that they spare people
with CIDD from unwise transactions that deplete their
resources and therefore diminish their quality of life.117 But
because wills do not become effective until death, testamentary
incapacity does not protect anyone from the burdens of their own
bad choices. Also, unlike fraud, duress, and undue
influence—which nullify wills that are obtained through the
antisocial actions of a third party—incapacity applies in the
absence of any wrongdoing.118 Thus, some treatises explained
testamentary capacity in circular terms, asserting that “Mad
Folks . . . cannot make a Testament [because] . . . they know not
what they do,”119 and others acknowledged that it is “conceivable
that the law should not make any particular requirement of
mental capacity for testamentary purposes.”120
Despite these flaws, American states borrowed English
testamentary capacity law. For example, around the turn of the
nineteenth century, New York and New Jersey enacted statutes
that voided the wills of “person[s] of nonsane mind and
memory.”121 Like their English counterparts, most American
116.
Id. at 565.
117. Stannard v. Burns’ Adm’r, 22 A. 460, 462 (Vt. 1891); see In re Est. of
Lahr, 744 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Okla. 1987) (“[P]rohibitions regarding the ward’s
authority to deal with the ward’s property were designed to protect the ward
from those who would take advantage of the ward’s decreased physical
condition.”); Ralph C. Brashier, Conservatorships, Capacity, and Crystal Balls,
87 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 19 (2014) [hereinafter Brashier, Conservatorships] (“If a
[person under guardianship] cannot understand the basic implications of
contracts and gifts and is likely to impoverish herself by making foolish
agreements or improvident gifts, the court may find it necessary to remove her
power to enter contracts or make gifts.”).
118. See Smith v. Cuddy, 56 N.W. 89, 93 (Mich. 1893) (Grant, J.,
dissenting) (“In order to establish a case of undue influence, there must be a
wrongdoer to be resisted . . . .”).
119. HENRY SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS § 3
(6th ed. 1743) (1590).
120. THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 51, at 233
(1953).
121. See An Act Concerning Wills, 1795, § III, 1800 N.J. Laws 189, 190,
https://perma.cc/2C6D-7A4K
(PDF)
(“[W]ills
or
testaments
made . . . by . . . any idiot, lunatic, or person of nonsane mind and memory,
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judges interpreted these phrases to require testators to “know
what [their] property was, and who those persons were that then
were the objects of [their] bounty.”122
Then, in 1820, in a long-forgotten will contest, a sitting
Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court distilled the doctrine of
testamentary capacity into an influential four-part test. In
Harrison v. Rowan,123 Bushrod Washington—the nephew of
George Washington—gave a jury instruction that broke the
“sound mind” requirement into specific elements:
[The testator] ought to be capable of making his will, with [1]
an understanding of the nature of the business in which he
is engaged;—[2] a recollection of the property he means to
dispose of;—[3] of the persons who are the objects of his
bounty, and [4] the manner in which it is to be distributed
between them.124

shall not be held or taken to be good, or effectual, in law.”); An Act to Reduce
the Laws Concerning Wills into One Statute, § V, 1801 N.Y. Laws 178, 178,
https://perma.cc/K6XE-UUGK (PDF) (“[N]o last will and testament aforesaid
made by . . . any infant, idiot, or person of insane memory shall be valid in
law.”); John B. Rees Jr., American Wills Statutes: I, 46 VA. L. REV. 613, 656
n.343 (1960) (collecting authorities). Maryland, however, imposed a higher
capacity standard that required a testator to be “capable of executing a valid
deed or contract.” 1860 Md. Laws 685, https://perma.cc/899A-W5XJ (PDF).
122. Clarke v. Fisher, 1 Paige Ch. 171, 173 n.1 (N.Y. Ch. 1828); see Starrett
v. Douglass, 2 Yeates 46, 49 (Pa. 1796) (“Disposing memory in a man is an
ability to make disposition of his estate, with understanding and reason.”);
Spencer v. Moore, 8 Va. (4 Call) 423, 424 (1798) (requiring that the testator
“be able to bestow his property with understanding and reason”); Den v.
Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589, 661 (1819), overruled in part by Meeker v. Boylan, 28
N.J.L. 274 (Sup. Ct. 1860) (“[T]he objects of a man making his last will are— his
property, its nature, its various parts and their relative value . . . .”).
123. 11 F. Cas. 658 (C.C.D.N.J. 1820).
124. Id. at 661. Justice Washington presided over the matter with Judge
William Pennington of the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey. Id. at 660. By contemporary standards, almost everything about this
case must seem odd. Today, Supreme Court Justices typically do not preside
over jury trials; judicial panels are typically comprised of an odd, not even,
number of judges; a single judge, rather than a judicial panel, typically
presides over trial court matters; federal circuit courts typically hear appeals
rather than jury trials; and federal courts no longer have subject matter
jurisdiction over state law probate matters because the probate exception to
federal subject matter jurisdiction now requires that will contests be litigated
exclusively in state court. See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 308 (2006).
We suspect that Harrison may be the only will contest tried in a federal circuit
court to a sitting member of the United States Supreme Court.
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After Harrison, courts throughout the country adopted
Justice Washington’s granular formulation of the testamentary
capacity doctrine, often crediting him by name.125
However, as the years passed, four aspects of the rule
proved to be problematic. First, recall that the third prong of
Justice Washington’s rule mandated that a testator be capable
of identifying “the persons who are the objects of his bounty.”126
In the mid-nineteenth century, judges started to add the
adjective “natural” before “objects of his bounty,” thus requiring
that the testator be capable of identifying “the natural objects of
his bounty.”127 This revised standard became “[t]he rule of
almost universal application and acceptation to be applied in
determining whether a testator has testamentary capacity.”128
Yet “[t]he phrase ‘natural objects of bounty’ has eluded crisp
definition,”129 and even today in some states, “[t]here is
no . . . case that defines” this term.130

125. See McMasters v. Blair, 29 Pa. 298, 299 (1857) (citing Harrison);
Taylor v. Kelly, 31 Ala. 59, 72 (1857) (same); Delafield v. Parish, 25 N.Y. 9, 24
(1862) (same); McClintock v. Curd, 32 Mo. 411, 419 (1862) (same); Beaubien v.
Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459, 490 (1864) (same); Nicholas v. Kershner, 20 W. Va. 251,
256 (1882) (same); Chrisman v. Chrisman, 18 P. 6, 6 (Or. 1888) (same); Craig
v. Southard, 35 N.E. 361, 362 (Ill. 1893) (same); see also Hall v. Perry, 33 A.
160, 161 (Me. 1895) (“[A] disposing memory exists when one can recall the
general nature, condition, and extent of his property, and his relations to those
to whom he gives, and also to those from whom he excludes, his bounty.”).
126. Harrison, 11 F. Cas. at 661.
127. See Roe v. Taylor, 45 Ill. 485, 490 (1867) (“An understanding of . . . the
persons who were the natural objects of his bounty . . . [is] evidence of the
possession of testamentary capacity . . . .”); Gay v. Gay, 209 S.W. 11, 12 (Ky.
1919) (providing that the testator must “know the natural objects of his bounty
and his duty to them”); Lehman v. Lindenmeyer, 109 P. 956, 958 (Colo. 1909)
(describing the factor as requiring the testator’s ability to know “the number
and names of the persons who are the natural objects of his bounty, [and] their
deserts with reference to their conduct and treatment toward him”).
128. Gay, 209 S.W. at 12; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1(b) (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“If the donative transfer is
in the form of a will, . . . the testator . . . must be capable of knowing and
understanding in a general way . . . the natural objects of his or
her . . . bounty . . . .”).
129. Champine, supra note 22, at 77 n.248.
130. In re Est. of Hubbs, No. 102,875, 2011 WL 588493, at *5 (Kan. Ct.
App. Feb. 11, 2011); see In re Est. of Berg, 783 N.W.2d 831, 842 (S.D. 2010)
(“This Court has never been asked to define the natural objects of a testator’s
bounty.”).
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Second, jurisdictions disagree about the standard of proof
in incapacity cases. The majority view tasks the contestant with
“proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the testator
lacked mental capacity.”131 However, other states raise the
contestant’s burden to clear and convincing evidence,132 and still
others require the proponent to prove that it was more likely
than not that the testator possessed capacity.133 For these
reasons, one practitioner’s guide calls this issue “a crazy quilt of
apparently conflicting and confusing maxims and principles
which vary from state to state in an astounding variety of verbal
formulae.”134
Third, states split over the scope of the doctrine. It is
well-established that “[t]he minimum level of mental capacity
required to make a will is less than that necessary to make a
deed[] or a contract.”135 Indeed, unlike testamentary capacity,
131. Looney v. Est. of Wade, 839 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Ark. 1992); see also In
re Est. of Killen, 937 P.2d 1368, 1371 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); Eyford v. Nord, 276
Cal. Rptr. 3d 309, 317 (Ct. App. 2021); In re Est. of Wiltfong, 148 P.3d 465, 467
(Colo. App. 2006); Hendershaw v. Est. of Hendershaw, 763 So. 2d 482, 483
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); In re Est. of Herbert, 979 P.2d 39, 51 (Haw. 1999);
Roller v. Kurtz, 129 N.E.2d 693, 697 (Ill. 1955); In re Est. of Todd, 585 N.W.2d
273, 276 (Iowa 1998); Est. of Washburn, 225 A.3d 761, 765 (Me. 2020); Slicer
v. Griffith, 341 A.2d 838, 843 (Md. App. Ct. 1975); Alberts v. Est. of Gray, No.
196666, 1998 WL 1997642, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1998); In re Est. of
Dion, 623 N.W.2d 720, 729 (N.D. 2001); In re Est. of Phillips, 795 S.E.2d 273,
281–82 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016); Stanek v. Stanek, No. 2018-CA-39, 2019 WL
3050523, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019); Amos v. Fish, 144 P.2d 967, 968 (Okla.
1944); Hairston v. McMillan, 692 S.E.2d 549, 552 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010); In re
Est. of Boote, 265 S.W.3d 402, 416 n.24 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007); In re Est. of
Graham, 69 S.W.3d 598, 606 (Tex. App. 2001); In re Est. of Kesler, 702 P.2d
86, 88 (Utah 1985); In re Est. of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1988).
132. See In re Est. of Farr, 49 P.3d 415, 426 (Kan. 2002); In re Succession
of Brown, 39,035 (La. App. 2 Cir. 10/27/04); 886 So. 2d 633, 635–36; Jeruzal’s
Est. v. Jeruzal, 130 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Minn. 1964); In re Est. of Fisher, 128
A.3d 203, 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015); In re Ziel’s Est., 359 A.2d 728,
733 (Pa. 1976); In re Est. of Bussler, 247 P.3d 821, 828 (Wash. App. Ct. 2011);
In re Est. of Persha, 649 N.W.2d 661, 673 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002).
133. See In re Est. of Edwards, 520 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Miss. 1988); In re
Will of Buckten, 178 A.D.2d 981, 982 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Weedon v. Weedon,
720 S.E.2d 552, 558 (Va. 2012).
134. EUNICE L. ROSS & THOMAS J. REED, WILL CONTESTS § 6:13 (2d ed.
1999).
135. Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Ky. 1998); see Weaver v.
Mietkiewicz, No. 10-P-2260, 2012 WL 592849, at *1 (Mass. Ct. App. Feb. 24,
2012) (“[T]he standard for executing a will is different from and less stringent
than the standard for the capacity to execute a contract.”).
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contractual capacity only exists if a person has the ability to
understand the consequences of the transaction.136 Yet
contemporary estate planning often involves nonprobate
mechanisms such as revocable inter vivos trusts, life insurance,
and pay-on-death accounts.137 Although these devices are either
contract-like or full-fledged contracts, they are known as “will
substitutes” because they are “functionally indistinguishable
from a will.”138 As a result, authorities diverge on whether to
resolve contests featuring these nonprobate devices under the
test for contractual capacity or testamentary capacity.139
Fourth, capacity litigation unfolds in an awkward posture.
Courts hold that “the validity of a will depends on the state of
[the testator’s] intellect at the time of its execution.”140 As a
result, “execution would be the ideal time to determine
capacity.”141 But because wills are “ambulatory”—testators can
revoke or amend them until death142—the traditional rule is
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a) (AM. L. INST.
1979) (explaining that a contract is voidable if a party “is unable to understand
in a reasonable manner the nature and consequences of the transaction”).
137. See John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of
the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1108–09 (1984).
138. Id. at 1109.
139. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 22 (AM. L. INST. 1959)
(adopting the contractual capacity standard for inter vivos revocable trusts),
and Fantin v. Fantin, No. FSTCV166027439S, 2017 WL 4872858, at *18
(Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 6, 2017) (same), and In re Armster, No.
M2000-00776-COA-R3CV, 2001 WL 1285904, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 25,
2001) (“The mental capacity required to execute a general durable power of
attorney, revocable living trust and warranty deed are essentially the same
and equate to the mental capacity required to enter into a contract.”), and In
re Head’s Est., 615 P.2d 271, 274 (N.M. 1980) (explaining that the same rule
governs a person’s capacity to “enter[] into a civil contract, [or] execute a trust
or an amendment thereof”), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(3) (AM.
L. INST. 2003) (“A person has capacity to create a revocable inter vivos trust by
transfer to another or by declaration to the same extent that the person has
capacity to transfer the property inter vivos free of trust in similar
circumstances.”), and UNIF. TR. CODE § 601 (UNIF. L. COMM’N amended 2010)
(“The capacity required to create, amend, revoke, or add property to a
revocable trust, or to direct the actions of the trustee of a revocable trust, is
the same as that required to make a will.”).
140. Irish v. Smith, 8 Serg. & Rawle 573, 576 (Pa. 1822).
141. John H. Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship Model, 77
MICH. L. REV. 63, 67 (1978) [hereinafter Langbein, Living Probate].
142. See Cozzort v. Cunningham, 130 S.E.2d 171, 173 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963)
(“It is fundamental that a person having the right to dispose of his property by
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that “[j]udicial proceedings to probate a will while the testator
is living[] are unheard of.”143 Accordingly, contests based on
incapacity proceed under the “worst evidence” tradition:
testators cannot take the witness stand to demonstrate their
mental acuity or “authenticate or clarify [their] declarations,
which may have been made years, even decades past.”144
In sum, testamentary capacity has proven to be a
challenging topic. Moreover, as we discuss next, it has fallen out
of step with the disability rights movement.
B.

Testamentary Capacity and Disability Rights

As noted, legislatures and courts have gradually expanded
the rights of individuals who are subject to guardianships.145
This section reveals that people with CIDD still face obstacles
when they try to create wills.
The tension between testamentary capacity and disability
rights surfaces in several ways. First, it was once “practically a
universal rule that the mere fact one is under guardianship does
not deprive him of the power to make a will.”146 Much like a
criminal acquittal is not conclusive in a civil trial because of the
different standards of proof, courts require less evidence of
incapacity to appoint a guardian than to void a will:

will may, during his lifetime while he retains testamentary capacity, change,
modify or completely revoke a previously executed will and substitute therefor
a new and completely different plan for the disposition of his property.”); Alex
M. Johnson, Jr., Is It Time for Irrevocable Wills?, 53 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 393,
393 (2016) (“By definition and in every jurisdiction, wills are ambulatory
documents and can always be revoked prior to death.” (internal citations
omitted)).
143. Lloyd v. Wayne Cir. Judge, 23 N.W. 28, 29 (Mich. 1885) (Campbell,
J., concurring).
144. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88
HARV. L. REV. 489, 492 (1975).
145. See supra Part I.
146. Bd. of Trs. of Park Coll. v. Hall, 195 P.2d 612, 615 (Kan. 1948); see
Hayes v. Est. of Reynolds, 925 So. 2d 994, 999 n.2 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (“A
testator being assigned a guardian and/or guardian does not, by itself,
preclude the testator from executing a valid will.”); In re Est. of West, 887 P.2d
222, 229 (Mont. 1994) (same); Harrison v. Bishop, 30 N.E. 1069, 1071 (Ind.
1892) (“It is too plain for controversy that one might possess mental capacity
quite up to or beyond the standard thus established, and yet fall far short of
that necessary to enable him to transact business or manage his estate.”).

636

79 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 609 (2022)
One’s mental powers may be so far impaired as to
incapacitate him from the active conduct of his estate, and to
justify the appointment of a guardian for that purpose, and
yet he may have such capacity as will enable him to direct a
just and fair disposition of his property by will.147

In addition, because mental conditions wax and wane, even
a severely impaired testator might execute a will during a “lucid
interval.”148 Traditionally, then, “[e]ven the express finding in a
guardianship proceeding of a mental defect inconsistent with
testamentary capacity [gave] rise to only a presumption that the
incapacitated person was or remained incapable of making a
will.”149
However, two states have overruled this principle. For
example, in “a remarkable departure from . . . precedent,”150
lawmakers in New Jersey passed a statute declaring that if a
person under guardianship executes a will, her “property shall
descend and be distributed as in the case of intestacy.”151
Similarly, an Oklahoma statute annuls testamentary
instruments executed by persons under guardianships unless
they are “subscribed and acknowledged in the presence of a
judge of the district court.”152 As Ralph Brashier has observed,
“[t]hese statutes appear to exist in blithe ignorance of, or blatant
opposition to, the modern principles mandating that the state

147. Clement v. Rainey, 50 S.W.2d 359, 359 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
148. In re Est. of Alsup, 327 P.3d 1266, 1272 (Wash. 2014).
149. Id.
150. Brashier, Conservatorships, supra note 117, at 14.
151. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:12-27 (West 2021). The law only applies to
persons under a guardianship who have no other wills. See id. (governing “an
incapacitated person [who] dies intestate or without any will except one which
was executed after commencement of proceedings which ultimately resulted
in adjudicating a person incapacitated”).
152. OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 41(B) (2021). A few guardianship statutes once
provided that a “ward shall be wholly incapable of making any contract or gift
whatever, or any instrument in writing.” Skelton v. Davis, 133 So. 2d 432, 435
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (emphasis added) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 747.11
(1961)). In turn, some courts held that “[t]he statutory phrase . . . —‘any
instrument in writing’—clearly includes a will,” and invalidated wills made by
people under guardianships. Barnes v. Willis, 497 So. 2d 90, 92 (Ala. 1986).
However, these states have now deleted the phrase “instrument in writing”
and thus likely restored persons under a guardianship’s ability to engage in
testation. See Brashier, Conservatorships, supra note 117, at 38–39.
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impose upon [persons under guardianships] the least restrictive
alternative and maximize autonomy consistent with ability.”153
Second, under the nondelegation principle, a third party
cannot make a proxy will for an impaired testator.154 The
nondelegation rule consists of two components. The first
involves guardianships. A court supervising a guardianship
enjoys “all the powers over the estate and business
affairs . . . which the [person under a guardianship] could
exercise if the person were . . . present[] and not under
conservatorship.”155 For example, judges can authorize
guardians to give gifts, create trusts, and change beneficiaries
on pay-on-death accounts.156 In fact, with court approval,
guardians can even make fraught medical decisions, such as
subjecting a person under a guardianship to experimental
treatments or withholding life support or nutrition.157 Yet many
states do not permit guardians to obtain judicial approval to
draft and execute a person under a guardianship’s will.158
153. Brashier, Conservatorships, supra note 117, at 41.
154. See Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Personal Delegations, 78 BROOK. L. REV.
1231, 1244 (2013) (“[C]ourts and legislatures have generally designated
willmaking as nondelegable . . . .”); Ralph C. Brashier, Policy, Perspective, and
the Proxy Will, 61 S.C. L. REV. 63, 63–64 (2009) [hereinafter Brashier, Policy]
(“[F]or hundreds of years statutes of wills have assumed that only the testator
himself can design and execute his plan of testamentary distribution.”).
155. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-410(a)(2) (amended 2019).
156. Id.; see Brashier, Policy, supra note 154, at 87–89 (explaining that
some courts “authorize distributions from the incapacitated individual’s estate
when they believe that the individual would make such distributions if
capable” and others do if “a reasonably prudent person would make that gift
under the circumstances”).
157. See, e.g., In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712, 716 (Mass. 1982) (“[P]rior judicial
approval is required before a guardian may consent to administering or
withholding of proposed extraordinary medical treatment”); In re
Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337 (Minn. 1984) (“[I]f the [person
subject to guardianship’s] best interests are no longer served by the
maintenance of life support[], the probate court may empower the conservator
to order their removal”); cf. FLA. STAT. § 744.3215(b) (2021) (requiring a court
to approve a guardian’s request to subject a person subject to guardianship to
“experimental biomedical or behavioral procedure[s]”).
158. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-408(3) (amended 2019); ALA. CODE
§ 26-2A-136 (2021); ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.435 (2021); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-5408 (2021); IDAHO CODE § 15-5-408 (2021); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.5407
(2021); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-5-421 (2021); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2637 (2021);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-5-402.1 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-5-408 (LexisNexis
2021). Admittedly, a recent amendment to the UPC changes this principle and
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The second strand of the nondelegation doctrine governs
powers of attorney. People sometimes obviate the need for a
guardianship by granting an agent the right to act on their
behalf if they become incapacitated.159 Like guardians operating
pursuant to court approval, an agent under a power of attorney
generally has broad dominion. For instance, in the estate
planning context, principals can empower agents to execute or
amend a variety of nonprobate instruments.160 Nevertheless,
“[i]t is not legally possible . . . to authorize the holder of the
power to make a valid will for [a] mentally incompetent
person.”161 Thus, under the double-barreled nondelegation

permits a judge to authorize a guardian to “make, amend, or revoke the
[person subject to guardianship’s] will.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-411(a)(7)
(amended 2019). However, only a handful of states have adopted this
provision. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 2580(b)(13) (West 2021); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-14-411(1)(a)(g) (2021); HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:5-411(a)(7) (2021);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B, § 5-407(d)(7) (2021); MINN. STAT. § 524.5-411(a)(9)
(2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.078(1)(a) (2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 464-A:26-a (2021); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-420(8) (2021).
159. See, e.g., Scott v. Goldman, 917 P.2d 131, 134–35 (Wash. 1996) (“A
guardian is appointed by the superior court and must abide by the
[guardianship] laws . . . . An attorney-in-fact, on the other hand, is appointed
by the principal and, with few exceptions, his authority is limited to the
specific powers set forth in the power of attorney.”).
160. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 4264(a), (c), (f) (West 2021) (allowing an
agent to “[c]reate, modify, revoke, or terminate a trust”; “[m]ake or revoke a
gift of the principal’s property”; and “[d]esignate or change the designation of
beneficiaries to receive any property . . . on the principal’s death”). The power
of attorney must expressly grant the principal the authority to take these
actions. See id.; Schubert v. Reynolds, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 285, 288–89 (Ct. App.
2002) (holding that agent lacked power to create trust for principal when
power of attorney did not explicitly confer this right). Other states follow the
same general approach. See Stafford v. Crane, 382 F.3d 1175, 1184–85, 1184
n.2 (10th Cir. 2004) (collecting authority).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY, DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 34.5
cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1992); see CAL. PROB. CODE § 4265 (West 2021) (“A power
of attorney may not authorize an attorney-in-fact to make, publish, declare,
amend, or revoke the principal’s will.”); In re Est. of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d 72,
76 (Ark. Ct. Ap. 2003) (“A power of attorney . . . cannot bestow upon the
attorney-in-fact the power to create a will on behalf of a principal.”); Smith v.
Snow, 106 S.W.3d 467, 470 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (“[D]esignating a power of
attorney to make a will . . . is not permitted . . . .”); Perosi v. LiGreci, 948
N.Y.S.2d 629, 634 (App. Div. 2012) (“There are a few exceptions to the powers
which can be granted to an attorney-in-fact. These exceptions include, but are
not limited to[] the execution of a principal’s will . . . .”).
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principle, “an individual without a will who permanently loses
testamentary capacity is destined to die intestate.”162
Third, most states continue to adjudicate incapacity claims
after the testator dies. For more than a century, scholars have
proposed creating “living” (or “antemortem”) probate schemes
that permit a “will [to] be probated before the death of the
testator.”163 However, a mere handful of jurisdictions have
heeded this call. Indeed, only Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, and
Ohio give testators the ability to initiate “an accelerated will
contest”164 and obtain a court order deciding the validity of a will
during their lifetime.165 In these states—and these states
alone—the testator can take the witness stand and demonstrate
her capacity “in direct view of the court or jury.”166 But in the
other forty-two jurisdictions, “a court [lacks] power to determine
the validity of a will prior to the death of the maker.”167
162. Brashier, Ghostwritten, supra note 26, at 1812.
163. Henry C. Lewis, Current Topics and Notes, Ante-Mortem Probate of
Wills and Testaments, 50 AM. L. REV. 742, 742 (1916) (emphasis added); see
also David Cavers, Ante-Mortem Probate: An Essay in Preventive Law, 1 U.
CHI. L. REV. 440, 443 (1934) (“[T]he threat of the [will contest] is potent to exact
settlements.”). Michigan passed the first living probate statute in 1883. See
1883 Mich. Pub. Acts 1519. But two years later, the Michigan Supreme Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional because it did not require that all
interested parties receive notice of the proceeding. See Lloyd v. Wayne Cir.
Judge, 23 N.W. 28, 29 (Mich. 1885). Ninety years later, an influential law
review article rekindled interest in the topic. See Howard Fink, Ante-Mortem
Probate Revisited: Can an Idea Have a Life After Death?, 37 OHIO ST. L.J. 264,
266 (1976) (proposing that states pass statutes “providing for a declaratory
judgment as to the validity of a will and the capacity of its maker, to be brought
by the testator himself, against all those who would, upon the testator’s death,
be able to challenge the will”).
164. Langbein, Living Probate, supra note 141, at 73.
165. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.530 (2021); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-40-202(a)
(2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 1311 (2021); NEV. REV. STAT. § 30.040(2)
(2021); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 552:18 (2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-2B-1
(2021); N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-08.1-01 (2021); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 5817.02(A) (West 2021). Admittedly, several of these states have recently
adopted living probate regimes, which suggests that the idea has begun to
acquire fresh momentum. See David Horton & Reid K. Weisbord, Probate
Litigation, 2022 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 23),
https://perma.cc/WM8J-SQHT (PDF).
166. Fink, supra note 163, at 266.
167. Alexander v. Walden, 337 S.E.2d 241, 243 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985); see
Hodge ex rel. Skiff v. Hodge, 78 F. Supp. 2d 29, 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (“[I]t is
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The worst evidence tradition creates a stark contrast in the
procedures that apply to guardianships and those that govern
testamentary incapacity claims. For instance, in 2019, the Iowa
legislature gave respondents in guardianship proceedings the
rights to be informed of the factual basis of their alleged
incapacity168 and to be present at the hearing.169 But in 2021,
with In re Guardianship of Radda,170 the Iowa Supreme Court
reiterated that “will contests must await the testator’s death.”171
In that case, Vernon Radda, who suffers from schizoaffective
disorder and autism, was placed under a guardianship.172
Radda’s sister, Barbara Kiene, then discovered that he had
executed two wills.173 Kiene filed a request for declaratory relief
that Radda’s wills were invalid because he lacked testamentary
capacity when he signed them.174 The state high court held that
the probate code “does not allow a predeath will contest” and,
further, that no judge could decide whether Radda had the
present ability to create a will so long as Radda was still alive.175

premature to interpret or invalidate a will that has not yet been admitted to
probate because the testator is still alive.”); Pond v. Faust, 155 P. 776, 778
(Wash. 1916) (“[C]ourts have no power to inquire into the validity of wills prior
to the death of the maker, to determine the incompetency of the maker.”
(emphasis omitted)). One rationale for this rule is that testators can freely
revoke wills during their life, which means that “a beneficiary has no legally
protected interest in or entitlement to a decedent’s estate while the testator is
still alive.” Fenstermaker v. PNC Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, No. 3:17-CV-00778, 2018
WL 1472521, at *6 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2018) (quotation omitted). In turn, “any
ruling determining [a will’s] validity would constitute an improper advisory
opinion.” Kellar v. Davis, 829 S.E.2d 466, 470 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019). For a
thoughtful critique of the view that “no will speaks before death,” see
Katheleen Guzman, Wills Speak, 85 BROOK. L. REV. 647 (2020).
168. See IOWA CODE § 633.556(2) (2021) (“The petition shall contain a
concise statement of the factual basis for the petition.”).
169. See id. § 663.560(2) (“The respondent shall be entitled to attend the
hearing on the petition and all other proceedings. The court shall make
reasonable accommodations to enable the respondent to attend the hearing
and all other proceedings.”).
170. 955 N.W.2d 203 (Iowa 2021).
171. Id. at 208.
172. Id. at 206.
173. Id.
174. See id.
175. See id. at 213–14. The court cited two reasons for this rule. First, the
court explained that “[p]redeath challenges to wills may be a waste of
time— the testator might replace the will at issue with a new one, die without
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Thus, while guardianship law entitles respondents to
participate in decisions about their capacity, the conventional
law of wills prohibits testators from doing the same.
***
Testamentary capacity has divided courts and fallen behind
the disability rights movement. In the next Part, we refine our
understanding of the doctrine by reporting the results of an
empirical study of incapacity claims in trial court.
III. TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY ON THE GROUND
There is little information about how testamentary capacity
cases play out in practice.176 To start to fill this gap, we analyzed
incapacity claims in two datasets of probate matters. This Part
describes our methodology and findings.
For a variety of previous projects, we collected 3,449 probate
administrations from California. One batch consists of 2,100
cases that came on calendar in Alameda County between 2007
and 2010.177 Another contains 1,349 estates that were heard in
San Francisco County between 2014 and 2016.178
Admittedly, a study of two counties in a single state may
not be nationally representative. For instance, San Francisco is
one of the wealthiest cities in the United States,179 which could
warp the demographics of the decedents in our sample.
Likewise, because California is a community property
jurisdiction,180 it allows surviving husbands or wives to collect

property, or the challenger might die before the testator.” Id. at 213. Second,
the court observed that because wills are confidential, “a predeath challenge
might invade the testator’s privacy interest.” Id.
176. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests—An Empirical Study,
22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 607 (1987) (“Practitioners have written a
great deal about how to protect against and defeat will contests. All of the
analyses, however, have been undertaken in an empirical vacuum.”).
177. For a richer description of this dataset, see David Horton, Borrowing
in the Shadow of Death: Another Look at Probate Lending, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2447, 2477 (2018).
178. We used these files in David Horton & Reid K. Weisbord, Heir
Hunting, 169 U. PA. L. REV. 383, 410–11 (2021).
179. See Kellie Hwang & Nami Sumida, Here’s Exactly How Much Money
It Takes to Feel “Wealthy” in S.F. Versus L.A. and N.Y., S.F. CHRON. (May 13,
2021), https://perma.cc/ZEH5-BSW7 (last updated May 14, 2021, 10:56 AM).
180. See In re Landes, 627 B.R. 144, 156 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2021).
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their share of a deceased spouse’s property outside of probate.181
In turn, because the first spouse to die rarely appears in the
probate files, our sample contains a disproportionate number of
single decedents. Finally, California’s doctrine of testamentary
capacity differs slightly from other states. Unlike most
jurisdictions, the Golden State has codified the standard for
mental fitness to execute a will:
An individual is not mentally competent to make a will if, at
the time of making the will . . . [t]he individual does not have
sufficient mental capacity to be able to do any of the
following: (A) Understand the nature of the testamentary
act. (B) Understand and recollect the nature and situation of
the individual’s property. (C) Remember and understand the
individual’s relations to living descendants, spouse, and
parents, and those whose interests are affected by the will.182

This unique approach might cause litigants in California to
behave differently than litigants in other states.183
With these caveats in mind, we discovered several points of
interest. First, allegations of incapacity are a minor but visible
part of probate. In Alameda County, they surfaced in 15 of the
1,055 testacies (1.4%). Likewise, in San Francisco County, there
were 9 allegations of incapacity in the 676 estates with wills
(1.3%). These figures are in the same ballpark as previous
studies of probate litigation.184
Second, there were few standalone incapacity claims.
Indeed, only two contestants rested their entire case on the

181. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 13500 (West 2021) (authorizing the use of
spousal property petitions).
182. Id. § 6100.5(a). However, the legislature intended the statute “to
closely adhere to [existing] common law decisions.” Goodman v. Zimmerman,
32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 419, 424 (Ct. App. 1994).
183. Likewise, as we mention infra notes 350–355, California applies the
testamentary capacity rule to simple nonprobate transfers but contractual
capacity to more complex devices.
184. Cf. MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 184
(1970) (determining that 1.3 percent of wills from Cuyahoga County, Ohio
were contested on any grounds); Schoenblum, supra note 176, at 613–14
(reporting that less than 1 percent of testate administrations in Davidson
County, Tennessee generated challenges to a will’s validity); Edward H. Ward
& J. H. Beuscher, The Inheritance Process in Wisconsin, 1950 WIS. L. REV. 393,
415–16 (1950) (finding that, on average from 1929 to 1944, 3.5 percent of
estates from Dane County, Wisconsin involved will contests).
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assertion that the testator was mentally unfit.185 Instead,
challenges almost always raised incapacity in conjunction with
undue influence.186 Undue influence occurs when “the volition of
a testator is subjected to the coercion or domination of another
person.”187 One element required to raise a presumption of
undue influence is a kind of “incapacity light”: proof that the
testator suffered from a weakened intellect and thus was
susceptible to manipulation.188 Because incapacity and undue
influence go hand-in-hand, 20 of the 24 contests (83.3%) in our
data featured both claims.
Third, we unearthed a connection between incapacity
claims and self-made wills. Some background can frame this
discussion. Every jurisdiction validates “formal” wills that are
signed by the testator and two witnesses.189 To create a formal
will under the supervision of an attorney, a testator must pass
through two checkpoints that help ensure that she is not
incapacitated. First, attorneys owe an ethical obligation not to
prepare a will “for a client whom [she] reasonably believes lacks
the requisite capacity.”190 Second, the witnesses must affirm
185. Twenty contestants alleged incapacity and undue influence. One
contestant coupled an incapacity claim with allegations that the testator had
revoked her will, and another’s non-capacity legal theories were unclear.
186. See, e.g., Schoenblum, supra note 176, at 649 (finding that litigants
commonly pled both incapacity and undue influence in Davidson County,
Tennessee).
187. In re Caffrey’s Will, 159 N.Y.S. 99, 102 (Surr. Ct.), aff’d, 174 A.D. 398
(N.Y. App. Div. 1916), aff’d, 16 N.E. 1038 (N.Y. 1917).
188. See In re Est. of Smaling, 80 A.3d 485, 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013)
(explaining that a presumption of undue influence arises when “(1) the testator
suffered from a weakened intellect; (2) the testator was in a confidential
relationship with the proponent of the will; and (3) the proponent receives a
substantial benefit from the will in question”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.3 cmt. h (AM. L. INST. 2003) (listing “the
extent to which the donor was in a weakened condition, physically, mentally,
or both” as a key factor for determining whether there is a presumption of
undue influence).
189. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-502(a) (amended 2019) (explaining
that creating a notarized will requires the testator’s and two witnesses’
signatures); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(b) (West 2021) (same); see also Ashbel G.
Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE
L.J. 1, 6–9 (1941) (describing the function of these formalities).
190. AM. COLL. OF TR. & EST. COUNS., COMMENTARIES ON THE MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 162 (5th ed. 2016), https://perma.cc/97KR-MKA6
(PDF); see MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.14(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020)
(“When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity,
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that the testator is mentally sound.191 But not every will is
subject to these safeguards. Some testators create formal wills
without attorney input by either typing the document
themselves or filling out premade forms.192 And in some states,
including California, testators can bypass both lawyer and
witness participation by writing a holographic will.193 Our San
Francisco data, which is more detailed than its Alameda
counterpart, suggests that these shortcuts may be linked to
incapacity contests. Indeed, the proportion of incapacity
allegations among self-made wills (5/141, or 3.5%) was higher by
a statistically significant margin than the corresponding figure
in lawyer-written wills (4/535, or less than 1%, p=0.01).
Accordingly, the involvement of third parties during the
will-creation process may deter capacity contests.

is at risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken
and cannot adequately act in the client’s own interest, the lawyer may take
reasonably necessary protective action . . . .”); cf. Lovett v. Est. of Lovett, 593
A.2d 382, 386 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (“[A] lawyer has an obligation
not to permit a client to execute documents if he or she believes that client to
be incompetent . . . .”); Norton v. Norton, 672 A.2d 53, 55 (Del. 1996) (“[W]e
take the occasion to emphasize the importance for a lawyer who drafts a will,
particularly for an aged or infirm testator, to be satisfied concerning
competence and to make certain that the instrument as drafted represents the
intentions of the testator.”).
191. See In re Mitchell’s Est., 249 P.2d 385, 395 (Wash. 1952) (“[I]t is the
duty of witnesses subscribing a will not only to attest the formal execution of
the instrument but the testamentary capacity of the testator as well.” (citation
omitted)); Stevens v. Leonard, 56 N.E. 27, 30 (Ind. 1900) (“By placing his name
to the instrument, the witness, in effect, certifies to his knowledge of the
mental capacity of the testator, and that the will was executed by him freely
and understandingly, with a full knowledge of its contents.”). For that reason,
the UPC’s statutory form self-proving affidavit includes the following
statement to be sworn under oath by attesting witnesses: “to the best of our
knowledge the testator is [18] years of age or older, of sound mind, and under
no constraint or undue influence.” UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-504 (amended 2019)
(emphasis added) (brackets in original).
192. See, e.g., How to Make a Will Without a Lawyer: A Step-by-Step Guide,
FREEWILL, https://perma.cc/MC5D-AZU9 (last updated Dec. 2, 2021)
(providing instructions for writing a will without a lawyer, as well as the option
to use linked forms).
193. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2503 (2021); CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6111 (West 2021); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4 (2021); TEX. EST. CODE ANN.
§ 251.052 (West 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2021); David Horton, Wills
Law on the Ground, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1094, 1116 n.139 (2015) (collecting
additional statutes).
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Fourth, the worst evidence tradition casts a long shadow
over capacity litigation. Recall that the critical issue in these
disputes is the testator’s mental ability on the date she signed
the will.194 In our twenty-four capacity contests, an average of
about four years passed between the execution of the instrument
and the lawsuit. In fact, two of these challenges were filed more
than fourteen years after the testator put pen to paper.
Resolving these claims required witnesses to dredge up
memories from the distant past.
Table 1: Days Between Will and Incapacity Contest
(Alameda and San Francisco Counties)
N

Mean

Median

Minimum

Maximum

24

1,413

820

72

5,814

In addition, because the testator was not available to
testify, the record in most cases was hazy. Parties rarely
introduced facts that bore directly on the black-letter elements
of the capacity doctrine. Of course, there were exceptions. One
104-year-old testator had been deemed competent by her doctor
just before she signed her will.195 In another matter, the drafting
attorney ensured that the testator “knew who his family
members were, what he owned, and what he wanted to happen
to his assets.”196 But the vast majority of contests offered
nothing more than generalized medical evidence: proof that the

194. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
195. Reply and Objections to Contest and Grounds of Objection to Probate
of Purported Will and Affirmative Defenses Thereon at ¶ 5, Est. of Carmel
Anello, No. PES-16-299804 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2016).
196. Declaration of Michael E. Sholtes in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment or Adjudication of Issues ¶¶ 3, 6, 9, Est. of Taylor, No. RP 07-332824
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 8, 2008) (on file with authors).
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testator was suffering from cancer,197 Alzheimer’s disease,198
substance abuse,199 or a brain tumor.200 For example, one
testator, who had been diagnosed with dementia, happened to
see his primary care physician about two weeks before he
executed the instrument.201 The doctor determined that the
testator could not remember the date or solve relatively simple
math questions.202 Because the purpose of the visit was not to
assess the testator’s ability to make a will, the doctor did not ask
whether he understood what he owned or who he loved.203
To some degree, this evidentiary mist insulated wills from
lawsuits. For instance, in a dispute that progressed all the way
to a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of the proponent,
reasoning that “[t]o establish incapacity one must do more than

197. See, e.g., Objection to Admission to Probate of the Last Will and
Testament of Viktor Suslovsky at ¶ 8, Est. of Suslovsky, No. PES-14-297640
(Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 8, 2014) (alleging that the testator was “suffering [from]
advanced stage cancer, and was severely infirmed in mind and body as
exemplified by the fact that shortly after the will was purportedly signed he
could not even speak or communicate in any way”); Objection to Petition for
Probate of Will and for Letters Testamentary at ¶ 6, Est. of Cole, No.
PES-16-299880 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 22, 2016) (alleging “cognitive impairment
due to hepatic failure from metastatic breast cancer”); Opposition to Petition
for Probate of Will and Issuance of Letters Testamentary (Probate Code
Section 8004) and Will Contest (Probate Code Sections 8250-8254) at ¶ 5I.A.,
Est. of Rosien, No. PES-15-299361 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 8, 2016) (alleging
severe headaches, disorientation, and memory loss associated with “chemo
brain” syndrome).
198. See, e.g., Objection to Barbara La Gioiakotlarz’s Petition for Probate
of Will and for Letters of Administration with Will Annexed; Contest of Will
at ¶ 1, Est. of Oltranti, No. PES-16-299593 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2016)
(alleging that the testator’s Alzheimer’s disease made him “incompetent to
create any such will”).
199. See, e.g., Objections and Response of Paul A. Mapes to Petition for
Probate Filed on February 26, 2015, by Bonnie Schindhelm at 6, Est. of
O’Donnell, No. PES-15-298403 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 24, 2015) (challenging the
testator’s will due to his alcohol and opiate consumption).
200. See, e.g., Margret Dieberger’s Trial Brief at 3, Est. of Dieberger, No.
RP10545167 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 10, 2014).
201. See Declaration of Joel M. Klompus, M.D., in Support of Petition for
Letters of Administration with Will Annexed at ¶ 12, Est. of Oltranti, No.
PES-16-299593 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 11, 2016).
202. Id. ¶ 11.
203. See id. ¶¶ 11, 12 (opining that the decedent was not competent to
engage in testation but not discussing any of the prongs of the legal test).
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present a diagnosis.”204 Likewise, another challenger lost at the
summary judgment stage.205 The judge in this matter held that
the challenger had only proven what the testator’s “mental state
at the time of the testamentary act . . . may have been.”206 Thus,
without a smoking gun, some litigants struggled to demonstrate
incapacity.
Nevertheless, other contestants fared well. As Table 2
reveals, 2 (8.3%) prevailed when the beneficiaries withdrew the
will from probate and 15 (62.5%) settled.

204. Statement of Decision at 13, Est. of Diebeger, No. RP10-545167 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2014) (on file with authors). The case was a bare-knuckle
brawl between the testator’s new wife and his mother. See id. at 1–3. In an
interesting aside, the judge remarked that he was “left with the impression
that the fundamental dispute here may be less about money than it is about
the combatants’ competing claims to the affection of the [d]ecedent.” Id. at 4.
205. See Order Granting Motion of Petitioner Ottis Primus for Summary
Adjudication of the First Cause of Action, Testamentary Capacity, Denying
the Motion for Summary Adjudication of the Second Cause of Action, Undue
Influence, and Denying Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Est. of Taylor,
No. RP 07-332824 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 21, 2008) (on file with author).
206. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
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Table 2: Outcome of Capacity Claims
(Alameda and San Francisco Counties)
Result

N

Percent

Proponent
Won†

5

20.8%

Contestant
Won††

2

8.3%

Case
Settled

15

62.5%

Unclear

2

8.3%

Total

24

100%

Notes:
† Proponent wins include contests that
are voluntarily dismissed.
†† Contestant wins include wills that
are withdrawn from probate.
Because settlements are private, this is where our research
trail would normally go cold. But California requires parties to
obtain judicial approval of settlements that either require a
transfer of more than $25,000 of a decedent’s assets207 or involve
real property.208 Because every settlement of an incapacity
contest satisfied at least one of these criteria, we were able to
calculate each contestant’s “success rate”: the settlement
amount divided by the sum the contestant would have received

207.
208.

CAL. PROB. CODE § 9833 (West 2021).
Id. § 9832(a)(1).
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if she had invalidated the will.209 Table 3 elucidates that the
mean success rate was a healthy 58%, with a median of 66%.210
In fact, in one of the only “pure” incapacity cases, the contestant
took home more than $1.1 million, which was 90% of the value
of his claim.211 These results suggest that testamentary capacity
remains a potent tool for parties seeking to set aside a will.
Table 3: Incapacity Settlements
(Alameda and San Francisco Counties)
Median
Mean
Settlement
Amount

$151,864

$313,444

Success Rate

66%

58%

Note: We were able to calculate the success rate for
12 of the 15 settlements.
To conclude, our review of trial-level testamentary
incapacity cases suggests that they are usually filed years after
the testator executes her will, are often linked to self-made wills,
hinge on nonspecific evidence about the testator’s mental state,
and often generate favorable outcomes for the contestant. In the
next Parts, we tie the strands of the Article together by
examining the doctrinal and policy implications of our analysis.

209. A simple example can illustrate the success rate. Suppose Testator
had two children, Son and Daughter; owned $100,000 in property; and
executed a will leaving everything to Daughter. Son filed a will contest and
ultimately settled for $20,000. If Son had prevailed, he would have taken half
of the estate ($50,000) in intestacy. Thus, Son’s success rate would be
$20,000/$50,000, or 40 percent.
210. Of course, because all but one of these contests featured other types
of claims, we do not know whether beneficiaries were motivated to settle
because of the strength of the incapacity allegations.
211. See Petition to Approve Settlement Agreement, Exhibit A, Mutual
Release and Settlement Agreement at 3, Est. of Oltranti, No. PES-16-299593
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jun. 20, 2016).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY

This Part discusses three unresolved issues in capacity
litigation. First, it considers whether the worst evidence
tradition violates principles of procedural due process. Second,
it examines how the use of SDM might impact will-making.
Third, it suggests solutions to jurisdictional splits about the
nuances of testamentary capacity.
A.

Living Probate and Procedural Due Process

As mentioned, because persons under a guardianship forfeit
liberty and property interests, states have tried to establish
basic protections for procedural due process.212 However, these
changes create a dichotomy between guardianship law and wills
law. Before a court can deny an owner the power to sign
contracts or make gifts, it must give her notice, a hearing, and a
chance to participate in the proceeding.213 Conversely, under the
worst evidence tradition, judges cannot evaluate that same
individual’s ability to execute a will until she has died.214 Thus,
a more consistent approach would apply the procedural due
process principles now recognized in guardianship proceedings
to the will-making process by creating a living probate option.
This section explores this novel theory and concludes that it is
worthy of serious consideration.
1.

Property Interest

The first step in any procedural due process analysis is to
determine whether state action deprives an owner of a property
interest.215 As this subsection explains, there is a colorable
argument that the doctrine of testamentary capacity does so,

212. See, e.g., In re Mark C.H., 906 N.Y.S.2d 419, 426 (Surr. Ct. 2010); see
also supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.
213. See Hensley, supra note 95, at 719–20.
214. See Goldberg & Sitkoff, supra note 24, at 344 (“[C]ourts have long
recognized that posthumous litigation over wrongful interference with a
donor’s freedom of disposition poses an obvious and serious difficulty given the
inability of the donor [to confirm his intentions.] This ‘worst evidence’ problem
is inherent to the derivative structure of such litigation.” (internal citations
omitted)).
215. See Mathews v. Elridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).
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but courts have not addressed the question directly and it is not
clear how they would rule if presented with a live controversy.
For centuries, there was consensus that “the right to make
a will is in no sense a property right” and thus is not “protected
by any of the constitutional provisions whereby property is
protected.”216 To be sure, state courts sometimes waxed poetic
about testation, calling it “one of the most sacred rights attached
to property.”217 However, according to the conventional wisdom,
only “natural” rights—those that are “inherent, prepolitical, and
prelegal”—were property rights.218 And as a creature of the
state, the power to convey assets after death did not fit this
description:
In feudal England, only the king owned real property, which
represented the bulk of wealth, and only the king could
decide who could exercise real property rights when a person
died. During the decline of feudalism, Parliament enacted
the Statute of Wills to grant citizens the lawful right to
devise real property, qualified by regulations necessary to
preserve order. Hence, devising property came to be
regarded as a right created by statute, not a “property” right
inherent in the common law of England.219

216. 1 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS § 25, at 49 (3d ed. 1941); Hull v. Cartin,
105 P.2d 196, 205 (Idaho 1940); see Eyre v. Jakob, 55 Va. (1 Gratt.) 422, 430
(1858) (“The legislature . . . may to-morrow, if it pleases, absolutely repeal the
statute of wills and that of descents and distributions and declare that upon
the death of a party, his property shall be applied to the payment of his debts,
and the residue appropriated to public uses.”). However, most cases dealt with
the analytically distinct issue of whether inheritance is a constitutionally
protected property right. See Jefferson v. Fink, 247 U.S. 288, 294 (1918) (“Not
until the ancestor dies is there any vested right in the heir.” (internal citation
omitted)). Because heirs and beneficiaries enjoy a mere expectancy—not a
vested right—in a living person’s assets, courts hold that lawmakers have free
rein to limit inheritance. See id.; Magoun v. Ill. Tr. & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283,
288 (1898) (“[T]he right to take property by devise or descent is the creature of
the law, and not a natural right,—a privilege,—and therefore the authority
which confers it may impose conditions upon it.”).
217. In re Est. of Foss, 202 A.2d 554, 558 (Me. 1964); cf. In re Martinson’s
Est., 190 P.2d 96, 97 (Wash. 1948) (“The right of testamentary disposition of
one’s property as an incident of ownership, is by law made absolute.”).
218. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 1549, 1568 (2003).
219. Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Child. v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67 (Fla.
1990) (internal citations omitted); see United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625,
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In 1942, the Court endorsed this view in Irving Trust Co. v.
Day.220 Two days before her wedding, Helena Snyder signed a
document in which she surrendered her right to inherit from her
husband-to-be, John McGlone.221 Later, New York passed a
statute that guaranteed surviving spouses a share of their
deceased spouse’s estate and invalidated waivers like
Helena’s.222 Four years after that, John executed a codicil, which
republished his will.223 In turn, this triggered the new law,
voiding the prenuptial agreement and entitling Helena to a
statutory minimum inheritance from John’s estate.224 The
beneficiaries of John’s will argued that applying the statute
violated due process by “retroactively destroy[ing]” the property
rights they had acquired through the prenuptial agreement.225
Similarly, John’s executor contended that the state law
infringed John’s property rights in the contract.226 The Court
disagreed on both counts.227 In a sweeping passage, it implied
that states have total dominion over the field of inheritance:
Rights of succession to the property of a deceased, whether
by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead
hand rules succession only by sufferance. Nothing in the
Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to

627 (1896) (“[T]he right to dispose of his property by will has always been
considered purely a creature of statute, and within legislative control.”).
220. 314 U.S. 556 (1942); see id. at 562 (“Rights of succession to the
property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory
creation, and the dead hand rules succession only by sufferance.”).
221. Id. at 558. The statute required prenuptial agreements to be signed
by witnesses, and Helena’s was not. See id. at 559.
222. See id. at 558.
223. Id. at 559–60.
224. See id. at 560.
225. Brief of Appellants Edward McGlone & Robert McGlone, Infants, by
Ralph L. Kaskell, Jr., Special Guardian at 9, Irving Tr. Co. v. Day, 314 U.S.
556 (1942) (No. 51), 1941 WL 76708.
226. See Brief of Appellants Irving Trust Company and Thomas F.
McGlone, Jr., as Executors of the Est. of John J. McGlone, Deceased, Thomas
F. McGlone and Rose McGlone Meredith at 31, Irving Tr. Co., 314 U.S. 556
(No. 51), 1941 WL 76707.
227. See Irving Trust Co., 314 U.S. at 562.
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limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary
disposition over property within its jurisdiction.228

But in 1987, the Court muddied the waters in Hodel v.
Irving.229 Land allotted by Congress in the nineteenth century
to Native Americans had splintered over time into an
ever-growing number of concurrently-owned shares managed in
trust by the United States Department of the Interior.230 To
reverse this process, Congress passed the Indian Land
which
declared
that
certain
Consolidation
Act,231
highly-fractionated interests in the reservation would escheat to
the tribe and thus could not be transmitted by will or
intestacy.232 The Court held that the statute violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause because it denied owners a
cherished property right without providing just compensation:
[T]he character of the Government regulation here is
extraordinary [because it] . . . destroy[s] “one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property . . . .” In one form or another, the
right to pass on property—to one’s family in particular—has
been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal
times.233

Then, in a confusing maneuver, the Court cited Irving Trust
and “reaffirm[ed] the continuing vitality of the long line of cases
recognizing the States’ . . . broad authority to adjust the rules
governing the descent and devise of property.”234
Courts and scholars have resolved this conflict by
construing Hodel narrowly. The most common understanding is
that Hodel only deems the wholesale elimination of the ability
228. Id. The Court also held that John’s executor could not complain about
the impact of the statute because John had set its wheels in motion by signing
the codicil. See id. at 562–63. As the Court explained, if John had forfeited any
rights, “it was only because he exercised further testamentary privileges with
a condition attached, and thereby brought those consequences unwittingly or
intentionally upon himself and his estate.” Id. at 563.
229. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
230. Id. at 708.
231. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2221.
232. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 709.
233. Id. at 716 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979)).
234. Id. at 717.
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to convey an asset after death to be a deprivation of
“property.”235 Indeed, the Indian Land Consolidation Act did not
merely invalidate bequests of interests in land; instead, it also
prohibited owners from transmitting these parcels through
intestacy.236 Thus, a federal judge in Wisconsin has read Hodel
“as an attempt to preserve the holding in Irving Trust, while
making clear that total and ‘extraordinary’ restrictions will not
pass muster.”237 Likewise, Ronald Chester has argued that
although Hodel appears to be “revolutionary,” its impact “may,
upon further reflection, be minor.”238
At first blush, this interpretation of Hodel would seem to
doom any attempt to impose procedural due process principles
on capacity contests. Striking down a will made by an impaired
testator does not prevent her from conveying her possessions
after death. Indeed, even if the rule invalidates a person’s most
recent will, it permits her to pass her estate under a previous
instrument or through the laws of intestate succession.239
Because it leaves open other avenues for the posthumous
transmission of assets, it does not affect a constitutionally
protected property right.240
Nevertheless, this conclusion is hardly airtight. For
starters, Hodel is a takings case, and courts have generally
defined “property” more narrowly for takings purposes than

235. See Ronald Chester, Essay, Is the Right to Devise Property
Constitutionally Protected?—The Strange Case of Hodel v. Irving, 24 SW. U. L.
REV. 1195, 1209 (1995)
236. See Hodel, 481 U.S. at 709. Moreover, the Court observed that the
relatively low value of the interests meant that owners were extremely
unlikely to use “will substitutes” such as trusts. See id. at 716. Thus, the
statute effectively “total[l]y abrogat[ed]” the right to pass the asset after death.
Id. at 717.
237. Klauser ex rel. Whitehorse v. Babbitt, 918 F. Supp. 274, 280 (W.D.
Wis. 1996).
238. Chester, supra note 235, at 1199, 1209 (1995); cf. Jeffrey G. Sherman,
Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints
on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 99 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1288 (1999)
(criticizing Hodel and noting that the decision offers “no direct discussion of
why the right to bequeath is a constitutionally protected right”).
239. See Chester, supra note 235, at 1208 (discussing will substitutes).
240. See id. at 1209 (noting that the Court in Hodel did not say that
complete abrogation of descent and devise rights were unconstitutional, but
that complete abolition of certain property may constitute a taking).
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when evaluating due process.241 Thus, it is possible that state
regulations of testation would not trigger the Takings Clause
but would constitute the deprivation of a property right under
the Due Process Clause.
Moreover, Irving Trust coexists uneasily with the Court’s
more recent due process jurisprudence. Shortly after deciding
Irving Trust, the Justices expanded the definition of
constitutional “property,” announcing that it included all
“legitimate claim[s] of entitlement.”242 Having embraced this
broader concept, the Court later held that the government could
not deny a person public employment,243 welfare benefits,244
social security payments,245 and a driver’s license246 without
offering proper procedures. Likewise, lower courts have
recognized property rights in a motley assortment of things,
such as mineral rights247 and pawnshop goods.248 According to
the modern doctrine, even a single stick in the proverbial bundle
of rights associated with property ownership, such as the power
to use or exclude, could constitute a property interest entitled to
the protections of procedural due process.249 To give but one
example, the Sixth Circuit held that a spouse’s possessory rights

241. See Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 285 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“[W]hile certain property interests may not be taken without due process,
they may be taken without just compensation.” (quoting JOHN G. LAITOS, LAW
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWER
§ 9.04 (Supp. 2001))).
242. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); see
Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV.
885, 956 (2000) (explaining that “procedural due process protection cannot be
confined to property in the common law sense”).
243. See Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 556 (1956).
244. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
245. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
246. See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
247. See Wilson v. Bishop, 412 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ill. 1980).
248. See Fla. Pawnbrokers & Secondhand Dealers Ass’n v. City of Fort
Lauderdale, 699 F. Supp. 888, 890 (S.D. Fla. 1988); Landers v. Jameson, 132
S.W.3d 741, 751 (Ark. 2003).
249. See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666, 673, (1999) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the
right to exclude others.”); Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 12 (1991) (“[E]ven
the temporary or partial impairments to property rights that attachments,
liens, and similar encumbrances entail are sufficient to merit due process
protection.”).
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in the corneas of her deceased husband rose “to the level of a
‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the due process
clause.”250 If these abstract and ephemeral rights qualify for
procedural due process protection, it is hard to see why the
power to execute a will would not.
Finally, even if Irving Trust remains good law, it does not
speak to whether testation is a property right under state
constitutions. At least two states, Florida and Wisconsin,
recognize a constitutional “right to devise property.”251 Both
state constitutions also contain due process clauses that mirror
their federal counterpart.252 Thus, in these jurisdictions, the
government must offer testators sufficient process before
striking down a will.
In sum, will-making may be a property right that deserves
due process protection. As we discuss next, this raises the
question of whether the worst evidence tradition passes
constitutional muster.
2.

Process

If a property interest rises to the level of constitutional
concern, courts need to define what type of process is due before
the government can strip an owner of it. In most cases, people
are entitled to notice and a hearing before the deprivation.253
These procedures must be “reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise [them] of the pendency of the action

250. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 480, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
251. See Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Child. v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 67
(Fla. 1990); In re Beale’s Est., 113 N.W.2d 380, 383 (Wis. 1962) (“[T]he right to
make a will is a sacred and constitutional right, which right includes a right
of equal dignity to have the will carried out.”).
252. See McRae v. Douglas, 644 So. 2d 1368, 1372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(“An individual may, in a public employment context, establish entitlement to
procedural due process under the United States and Florida
Constitutions . . . .”); State v. Laxton, 647 N.W.2d 784, 789 n.8 (Wis. 2002)
(“The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions
protect both substantive and procedural due process rights.”).
253. See Leger v. Adams, No. 932589A, 1994 WL 879587, at *3 (Mass.
Super. Ct. July 15, 1994), aff’d sub nom. Leger v. Comm’r of Revenue, 654
N.E.2d 927, 930 (Mass. 1995) (emphasizing that due process requires that an
individual receive notice and a hearing before governmental deprivation of
property).
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and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”254
This section plunges into the murky waters of what steps the
state must take before allowing courts to invoke the doctrine of
testamentary capacity to set aside a will.
The analysis here begins with the Court’s seminal opinion
in Mathews v. Eldridge.255 The Social Security Administration
informed George Eldridge that his disability benefits were
ending.256 Eldridge sued, arguing that these payments were
property and that terminating them without an evidentiary
hearing violated his due process rights.257 The Court explained
that claims of deficient process revolved around three questions:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.258

Applying these factors, the Court found that Eldridge’s
right to benefits was “significant,” reasoning that if he was
disabled, it would be hard for him to find an alternative source
of income.259 But the Court also concluded that a hearing would
add little value.260 As the Court saw it, benefits assessments
could easily be decided on the papers, because they hinged on
“‘routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician
specialists,’ concerning a subject whom they have personally
examined.”261 Finally, the Court observed that it would be
expensive and burdensome for the government to offer

254. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
255. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
256. Id. at 323–24.
257. Id. at 324–25. Because Eldridge sued the federal government, he
invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 323.
258. Id. at 335.
259. Id. at 342–43.
260. Id. at 343–47.
261. Id. at 344 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 404 (1971)).
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full-fledged hearings every time it cut off disability benefits.262
For these reasons, the Court rejected Eldridge’s claim.263
Under Mathews, there is a plausible argument that the
worst evidence tradition is procedurally defective when
compared to a regime that offers testators the option of living
probate. The first prong—the private interest at stake—favors
testators. In general, “[t]he deprivation of real or personal
property involves substantial due process interests.”264 Of
course, as noted, invalidating a will only strips a person of a
single arrow in the quiver of property rights. Yet for the
purposes of Mathews, courts hold that people have strong
interests in discrete aspects of ownership, such as “the right of
sale, the right of occupancy, the right to unrestricted use and
enjoyment, and the right to receive rents.”265 Moreover, there is
no shortage of flowery judicial rhetoric about the importance of
testation. Indeed, the Wyoming Supreme Court has gone so far
as to declare that executing “a last will and testament is the
most solemn and sacred act of a man’s life.”266 For these reasons,
the scale tips against posthumous capacity litigation.
The second Mathews factor, which focuses on value of
additional procedures, also militates against the worst evidence
tradition. Mathews itself is instructive. As noted, the Court held
that a hearing was not necessary because decisionmakers were
privy to reports from doctors who had seen the claimant for the
purpose of evaluating her eligibility for disability benefits.267
But our California study suggests that disputes over
testamentary capacity almost never feature such rich factual
records.268 Instead, litigants and judges usually must piece
together the testator’s mental status from secondhand accounts

262. Id. at 347.
263. Id. at 349.
264. Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 61 (2d Cir. 2002).
265. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 54
(1993); see Serrano v. Customs & Border Patrol, 975 F.3d 488, 497 (5th Cir.
2020) (“An individual has an important interest in the possession of his or her
motor vehicle . . . .”).
266. Brimmer v. Hartt (In re Est. of Hartt), 295 P.2d 985, 1002 (Wyo.
1956).
267. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344 (1976).
268. See supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text.
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and proof from before or after the execution of the will.269 By
contrast, living probate would permit the factfinder to assess the
testator in person and in real time. Arguably, then, waiting until
a testator dies “creates an unacceptable risk of error.”270
Finally, the third Mathews inquiry, which looks at the cost
to the government of supplying the extra procedures, is
indeterminate. On the one hand, state courts are
underfunded,271 and living probate would expose them to
additional salvos of contests. Making matters worse, living
probate has the potential to increase the consumption of judicial
resources. A ruling upholding the will of a living testator may
only be temporary because the testator remains free to revoke
or amend the instrument.272 In turn, this creates a risk that
probate courts would need to decide multiple cases involving the
same individual. On the other hand, there is anecdotal evidence
that living probate petitions are rarely filed in jurisdictions that
permit them,273 which raises the possibility that the burden on
courts would be low and possibly offset by a corresponding
reduction in the number of posthumous will contests. Without
better data, it is hard to predict the outcome of the Mathews
balancing.
There are also three wild cards at play. First, precedent
from the guardianship context might foreclose a procedural due
process challenge to the worst evidence tradition. Recall that the
Court held in Craft v. Simon that a guardianship proceeding can
occur in the person under guardianship’s absence so long as a
guardian ad litem represents the person under guardianship’s

269. See supra notes 186–194 and accompanying text.
270. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. at 55.
271. See Judson R. Peverall, Inside State Courts: Improving the Market for
State Trial Court Law Clerks, 55 U. RICH. L. REV. 277, 277–78 (2020) (noting
that state officials warn that “inadequate funding has led to undue court
delays, case backlogs, and poorly decided cases”).
272. See Kristen A. Sluyter, Probate Law, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV.
399, 406 (2006) (“Unless a trust expressly states that it is irrevocable, the
settlor may revoke or amend the trust.”).
273. See Aloysius A. Leopold & Gerry W. Beyer, Ante-Mortem Probate: A
Viable Alternative, 43 ARK. L. REV. 131, 171–75 (1990) (noting that
practitioners in states that allow living probate report that parties virtually
never invoke the procedure).
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interests.274 Probate litigation also features litigation by
surrogate.275 The beneficiaries—who inherit if the will is
valid—have strong incentives to defend the testator’s capacity.
Arguably, then, even if the testator is not in the courtroom, third
parties can vindicate her opportunity to be heard.
Second, it is not clear that deceased testators have due
process rights. The relationship between the Constitution and
the dead is ridiculously confusing. Several federal courts have
broadly declared that the constitutional rights “of a person
cannot be violated once that person has died.”276 These cases
tend to involve personal representatives of deceased victims of
police violence alleging that officials covered up the killing.277
Judges reject these claims on the grounds that “[a]fter death,
one is no longer a person within our constitutional and statutory
framework, and has no rights of which he may be deprived.”278
In turn, this logic suggests that the worst evidence tradition is
immune from a constitutional attack. After all, the state does
not decide whether to enforce a will until the testator is in the
grave.
There is also authority that cuts the other way. For starters,
Hodel recognized a posthumous constitutional violation by
holding that the federal government impermissibly took

274. Craft v. Simon, 182 U.S. 427, 436–37 (1901); see supra notes 65–69
and accompanying text.
275. See Kohn, supra note 104, at 321–22.
276. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743, 749 (10th Cir. 1980).
277. See, e.g., Judge v. City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 76 (1st Cir. 1998),
overruled on other grounds by Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion v.
Hernandez, 367 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2004); Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 165 (2d
Cir. 2001); Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979); Guyton v.
Phillips, 606 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1979); Silkwood, 637 F.2d at 749.
278. Whitehurst v. Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979); see Judge v.
City of Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 76 n.15 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[W]e note that all of the
actions that form the basis of Judge’s claims occurred subsequent to Weems’s
death. At that time, Weems had no rights of which he could be deprived.”);
Ford v. Moore, 237 F.3d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Even if there were a viable
claim against Moore for conduct after Ford’s death, the death would have
extinguished any claim of Ford’s.”); Est. of Conner by Conner v. Ambrose, 990
F. Supp. 606, 618 (N.D. Ind. 1997) (“It is clear that § 1983 does not provide a
cause of action on behalf of a deceased based upon alleged violations of the
deceased’s civil rights which occurred after his death.”). But see Fred O. Smith,
Jr., The Constitution After Death, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1479–86 (2020)
(criticizing these decisions).
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decedents’ property without just compensation.279 Similarly,
courts in the District of Columbia, Florida, Montana, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania have held that mortmain statutes violated the
Equal Protection Clause.280 Mortmain legislation invalidates
charitable bequests made within a set time—often about a
month—before the testator’s death.281 These laws “were
intended to require gifts to charity to be made with proper
deliberation and at a time when the testator was in at least
reasonably good physical and mental condition.”282 But as
judges recognized, they spawn such arbitrary results that they
lack a rational basis:
The statute strikes down the charitable gifts of one in the
best of health at the time of the execution of his will and
regardless of age if he chances to die in an accident 29 days
later. On the other hand, it leaves untouched the charitable
bequests of another, aged and suffering from a terminal
disease, who survives the execution of his will by 31 days.283

279. See supra notes 229–233 and accompanying text. There is a way to
square Hodel with the police cover-up cases. The latter involve claims under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, which only applies to “persons.” Whitehurst v. Wright, 592
F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979). As the Ninth Circuit has opined, “the term
‘person’, as used in a legal context, defines a living human being and excludes
a corpse or a human being who has died.” Guyton v. Phillips, 606 F.2d 248,
250 (9th Cir. 1979). Conversely, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause is
self-executing,” which means that “[a] takings plaintiff is not required to
invoke § 1983.” Devillier v. Texas, No. 3:20-CV-00223, 2021 WL 1200893, at
*4–5 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 22, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:20-CV-00223, 2021 WL 1199369 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2021). Because there is
no requirement that a takings plaintiff be a “person,” a decedent’s estate can
pursue such a claim.
280. See In re Cavill’s Est., 329 A.2d 503, 505–06 (Pa. 1974); Est. of French,
365 A.2d 621, 623–24 (D.C. 1976); Shriners Hosps. for Crippled Child. v.
Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 70 (Fla. 1990); In re Kinyon’s Est., 615 P.2d 174, 175
(Mont. 1980); Shriners’ Hosp. for Crippled Child. v. Hester, 492 N.E.2d 153,
156 (Ohio 1986).
281. See Decker v. Vreeland, 115 N.E. 989, 990 (N.Y. 1917) (applying New
York’s mortmain statute); G. Stanley Joslin, Florida’s Charitable Mortmain
Act, 7 MIA. L.Q. 488, 488–89 (1953) (describing mortmain statutes in
California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maryland,
Mississippi, Montana, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania).
282. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 326, at
566–67 (2d ed. 1977).
283.
In re Cavill’s Est., 329 A.2d 503, 505–06 (Pa. 1974).
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Even though mortmain legislation does not apply until the
court carries out the will, some of these opinions held that the
statutes deprived testators of equal protection.284 Thus, these
cases create further uncertainty by implying that constitutional
rights can survive death.
Third, conceptualizing testation as a property right would
create mind-bending logistical problems. As noted, courts would
need to give testators notice and a hearing before refusing to
enforce their last wishes. Arguably, this mandate would apply
not only to incapacity contests, but to the entire sprawling
universe of rules that can nullify a will, including fraud, duress,
undue influence, and violation of the execution formalities.285
Fulfilling this duty would be close to impossible. Judges could
not give individualized notice: during someone’s life, they have
no way of knowing that she has made a will—let alone that a
disappointed heir is going to try to overturn it. Thus, the
government would need to fall back on the theory that testators
who do not take advantage of living probate waive their due
process rights.286 But because “[w]aivers of constitutional rights
not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent
acts,” this assertion is a stretch.287 A testator’s failure to invoke
an arcane procedural option hardly seems like an informed
choice. Accordingly, rather than open this Pandora’s Box, a court
would likely hold that testators lack procedural due process
rights.
To conclude, a procedural due process challenge to the worst
evidence tradition would face major barriers. Yet it is also worth
observing that the worst evidence tradition is a far cry from the
procedures courts generally offer before depriving an owner of a
property right. In the next section, we pivot from this thought
284. See In re Kinyon’s Est., 615 P.2d 174, 176 (Mont. 1980). But cf. Est. of
French, 365 A.2d 621, 624 (D.C. 1976) (concluding that a mortmain statute
violated the equal protection rights of the will’s beneficiaries).
285. See, e.g., In re Saenger’s Est., 335 A.2d 601, 602 (N.J. Prob. Div. 1975)
(describing the formalities required to execute a valid will); Mark Glover, The
Timing of Testation, 107 KY. L.J. 221, 244 (2019) (“[F]raud, duress, and undue
influence all involve a wrongdoer undermining the testator’s freedom of
disposition, so that the estate plan described in a will reflects the wrongdoer’s
intent rather than the testator’s intent . . . .”).
286. Due process rights are indeed “subject to waiver.” D.H. Overmyer Co.
of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
287. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
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experiment to the more practical topic of will-making through
SDM.
B.

Supported Decision-Making (SDM)

As SDM continues to spread, questions are likely to arise
about how it intersects with the doctrine of testamentary
capacity. This section evaluates three such issues. First, it
contends that SDM statutes allow supporters to assist
principals with estate planning. Second, it claims that the
nondelegation rule does not bar this species of third party
will-making. And third, it briefly explores whether SMD should
serve as a substitute for the traditional requirement of capacity.
Although SDM statutes do not expressly address testation,
they seem to include it as a permissible activity. Most provisions
contain expansive language that allows supporters to “[h]elp the
principal access, obtain, and understand any information that is
relevant
to
any
given
life
decision,
288
including . . . financial[] . . . decisions.”
Some even authorize
support with “managing income and assets”289 and “[l]egal
affairs.”290 Thus, if the parties want, they can work together on
estate planning.
However, there is friction between the nondelegation rule
and the use of SDM for will-making. As noted, the nondelegation
principle prohibits both guardians and agents acting under
powers of attorney from making proxy wills for impaired
testators.291 Because the rule reflects the view that “the power
to make a will is personal,”292 it might also prevent supporters
from aiding testators. There is a thin line between a guardian
or agent dictating a will for a person with CIDD and a supporter
shepherding the person through the estate planning process.
But for several reasons, courts should not extend the
nondelegation rule to SDM. For one, nondelegation laws are
context specific. In the estate planning setting, the
288. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9406A (2021).
289. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.160(2) (2021); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.130.010(38) (2021) (“personal and financial decisions”).
290. N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-36-01(e) (2021); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 42-66.13-3(vi) (2021) (“[l]egal assessments and advisement”).
291. See Brashier, Ghostwritten, supra note 26, at 1811.
292. In re Est. of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003).
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nondelegation rule applies specifically to proxy will-making by
guardians and agents acting under a power of attorney.293 But
because SDM is an alternative to both guardianships and
powers of attorney, supporters do not fall within the scope of
these rules.294 Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine only
precludes guardians and agents from making wills for
individuals with CIDD.295 Indeed, the rule stops third parties
from substituting their judgment for the testator’s or
determining what is in the testator’s best interest.296 But in
SDM, principals make their own choices.297 Thus, wills made
with support violate neither the letter nor the spirit of the
nondelegation rule.
There are other compelling reasons to limit the
nondelegation principle. The doctrine is notoriously “odd”298 and
“illogical.”299 For starters, because guardians and agents
generally enjoy the power to make crucial decisions for wards
and principals—including giving away property or placing it
into trust—prohibiting them from helping people with CIDD
give away property in a will or a testamentary trust created by
a will is anomalous.300 In fact, this suspicion of proxy wills is
exactly backwards. Lifetime transfers are more perilous for
people with CIDD than testamentary instruments. An unwise
inter vivos conveyance can deplete an owner’s bank account and
leave her destitute, but a will cannot impoverish anyone. Thus,
because the nondelegation rule lacks a solid policy foundation,
it should not govern new settings like SDM.
A final area of uncertainty is whether support confers
capacity on a testator who would otherwise lack it. Only three

293. See supra notes 154–161 and accompanying text.
294. See Guardianship of A.E., 552 S.W.3d 873, 887 (Tex. App. 2018)
(discussing the purpose of SDM statutes).
295. See supra notes 154–161 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 154–161 and accompanying text.
297. SDM is thus analogous to decisions that refuse to apply the
nondelegation doctrine when an agent “merely acted as a conduit or messenger
between the decedent and [the estate planner] concerning the decedent’s
wishes.” Est. of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d at 76. In both situations, the testator
remains the ultimate decisionmaker.
298. Boni-Saenz, supra note 154, at 1246.
299. Brashier, Ghostwritten, supra note 26, at 1836.
300. See supra notes 156, 160 and accompanying text.
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SDM statutes seem to address whether the process is “capacity
boosting.” Alaska answers that question in the affirmative by
declaring that “a principal is considered to have capacity even if
the capacity is achieved by the principal receiving
decision-making assistance.”301 At the opposite pole, statutes in
Delaware and Nevada authorize SDM if the principal “does not
harm others and is capable of making decisions about such
matters.”302 The italicized language suggests that SDM does not
lift principals above the capacity threshold; rather, it can only
help those who already possess capacity to make better
decisions. Unfortunately, the remaining SDM laws do not say
whether “an individual using a supporter is considered to be
competent.”303
Both approaches are defensible. On the one hand, deeming
support to be capacity enhancing would expand access to an
important ritual. Testation is valuable for financial and
emotional reasons.304 Indeed, it permits decedents to provide for
their loved ones and serves as a form of self-expression.305 Thus,
the law should do everything in its power to open this door for
people with CIDD. Similarly, a kind of informal SDM is already
baked into estate planning. In a typical estate planning
consultation, attorneys help testators plan for contingencies,
such as the possible death or birth of named beneficiaries and
the potential acquisition or disposition of property by the
testator after the will’s execution. By providing legal advice
regarding those critical aspects of estate planning, attorneys
support the decision-making of testators who, in turn, are better
301. ALASKA STAT. § 13.56.150(d) (2021).
302. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 9402A(b)(1) (2021) (emphasis added); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 162C.100(2)(a) (2021) (emphasis added).
303. Phillips, supra note 18, at 637.
304. See, e.g., Mark Glover, The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary
Formality, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 139, 147 (2012) (describing the therapeutic
aspects of the estate planning process).
305. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory
of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1992) (describing the benefits of testation);
Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of
Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 878 (2012) (cataloguing the downsides of
intestacy); David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 66 (2012)
(arguing that testation is a final form of commentary about the world and loved
ones); Deborah S. Gordon, Reflecting on the Language of Death, 34 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 379, 395 (2011) (describing benefits of including expressive language
in wills).
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able to understand the ramifications of their choices. In
addition, when a client is impaired, it is common for her “family
members or other persons [to] participate in discussions with
the[ir] lawyer.”306 Thus, validating wills made via SDM would
merely acknowledge what is often the case: that third parties
provide scaffolding for testators.
On the other hand, treating support as a substitute for
capacity could have serious downsides. For one, even proponents
of SDM acknowledge that it “could be used as a means of
financial exploitation.”307 Indeed, creating incentives for SDM
will-making might permit malicious supporters to hijack a
testator’s dispositive choices.308 At bare minimum, courts would
need to perform the thankless task of distinguishing between
legitimate assistance and rank undue influence. Moreover, even
well-intentioned third parties may not be able to help principals
grasp the fundamentals of will-making. Although research on
SDM has only just begun, there is some evidence that it can be
more effective for routine choices than for complex ones.309 Thus,
in some cases, deeming support to “cure” testamentary
incapacity would be a fiction.
Accordingly, wills made through SDM may be on the
horizon. Properly understood, the nondelegation rule should not
prevent supporters from helping testators. Only time will tell
whether SDM does (or should) displace the conventional test for
capacity and, if it does, whether wrongdoers will be able to
exploit SDM to unduly influence a principal’s estate plan. Next,
we discuss two additional areas of doctrinal uncertainty.
C.

Jurisdictional Splits

As mentioned, states disagree about who are the natural
objects of the testator’s bounty and which capacity test to apply
306. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.14 & cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
307. Megan S. Wright, Dementia, Autonomy, and Supported Healthcare
Decisionmaking, 79 MD. L. REV. 257, 307 (2020).
308. See id. at 307–08.
309. See Terry Carney et al., Paternalism to Empowerment: All in the Eye
of the Beholder?, DISABILITY & SOC’Y., July 12, 2021, at 14–17,
https://perma.cc/LQS4-WV6Q (PDF) (reviewing data from interviews with
people in Australia and raising questions about whether SDM facilitated
informed decision-making when applied to complex choices such as whether to
undergo a medical procedure).
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to nonprobate transfers.310 This section tries to clarify these
issues.
1.

Natural Objects

One perennial problem in capacity litigation is the meaning
of the phrase “natural objects of the testator’s bounty.”311 This
section argues that courts should only find a will to be
“unnatural” when there is clear and convincing proof that it
divides property in an irrational fashion.
There are two main definitions of “natural objects.” The
dominant view is what we call the “intestacy” theory. Courts in
this camp hold that the phrase “is a euphemistic way of defining
‘next of kin,’ or those who would take in absence of a will.”312
Seen through this prism, a testator’s exclusion of blood relatives
is “strong evidence[] of a derangement in one department in his
mind.”313 However, other judges follow what we refer to as the
“relationship” theory and hold that “natural objects” are “those
people related to [the testator] by ties of blood or affection.”314 As
the Indiana Supreme Court explained:
By natural object is not meant the legal object recognized by
the law of descent, for the power and purpose to disregard
some canon of descent is necessarily implied in the making
of any will . . . . The jury is to determine, not what the
310. See supra Part II.A.
311. See supra notes 126–130 and accompanying text.
312. In re Est. of Hubbs, No. 102,875, 2011 WL 588493, at *5 (Kan. Ct.
App. Feb. 11, 2011); Page v. Phelps, 143 A. 890, 894 (Conn. 1928); In re Est. of
Strozzi, 903 P.2d 852, 857 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).
313. Johnson v. Moore’s Heirs, 11 Ky. 371, 374 (1822) (setting aside a will
that devised property to decedent’s girlfriend, an enslaved person, because
disinheritance of siblings was proof of incapacity).
314. In re Est. of Roeseler, 679 N.E.2d 393, 401 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)
(emphasis added); see In re Sheldon’s Will, 16 N.Y.S. 454, 460 (Surr. Ct. 1891),
aff’d, 21 N.Y.S. 477 (Sup. Ct. 1892) (mem.), aff’d, 36 N.E. 343 (N.Y. 1894)
(mem.) (“The natural objects of a testator’s bounty are not always those whom
the statute declares shall take the property of an intestate, but may depend
upon the life they have lived . . . .”); Goddard v. Dupree, 76 N.E.2d 643, 645
(Mass. 1948); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 8.1 (AM. L. INST. 2003) (“Relatives by affinity do not take by
intestacy but could be counted as natural objects of a testator’s bounty in the
case in which the testator was close to them . . . . The natural objects of the
testator’s bounty might include nontraditional as well as traditional family
members.”).
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testator would probably have done if governed by fixed
canons of descent or any law of human contrivance, but what
he might, under all the evidence.315

In general, the relationship theory is superior to the
intestacy theory. For starters, the intestacy theory is
anachronistic. Decades ago, in the heyday of the nuclear family,
a testator’s choice to disinherit her heirs might have raised a red
flag about her cognition.316 Indeed, failing to provide for blood
relatives—the people whom a testator presumably loved—could
betray confusion about the testamentary act.317 But today,
intestacy statutes are badly outdated. Although so-called
“non-traditional” families are fast becoming the norm,318
intestacy laws generally exclude “stepchildren, unmarried
partners, nonbiological children, and multigenerational
households.”319 Thus, leaving assets to non-heirs is not
necessarily probative of anything—let alone incapacity.320

315. Breadheft v. Cleveland, 110 N.E. 662, 663 (Ind. 1915).
316. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.3 (AM. L. INST. 2003) (describing the decision to “abruptly and without
apparent reason disinherit[] a faithful and deserving family member” as one
“that a reasonable person would regard . . . as unnatural, unjust, or unfair”).
317. See M.C. Slough, Testamentary Capacity: Evidentiary Aspects, 36
TEX. L. REV. 1, 20 (1957) (“When a testator passes over the natural objects of
his bounty in favor of an outsider, it is not uncommon for courts to characterize
his action as harsh or unnatural or irrational, treating it as corroborative
evidence of lack of testimentary [sic] capacity.”).
318. For instance, in 1950, more than three-quarters of American families
consisted of married, opposite-sex spouses with genetic children, but by 2010,
that figure fell to less than half. See Katherine M. Arango, Note, Trial and
Heirs: Antemortem Probate for the Changing American Family, 81 BROOK. L.
REV. 779, 782 (2016); see also Megan Doherty Bea & Emily S. Taylor Poppe,
Marginalized Legal Categories: Social Inequality, Family Structure, and the
Laws of Intestacy, 55 L. & SOC’Y REV. 252, 256 (2021) (explaining why “the
kinds of family structures deprioritized by the laws of intestacy are quite
prevalent”).
319. Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Big Data and the Modern Family, 2019 WIS. L.
REV. 349, 350 (2019).
320. See Goble v. Grant, 3 N.J. Eq. 629, 636 (N.J. Prerog. Ct. 1835) (“Very
often, the object of making a will is to discriminate, or to exclude and give
preferences; and not unfrequently, the reasons for so doing are known only to
the testator . . . .”).
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The intestacy theory also penalizes “cultural minorities.”321
A related critique of the doctrine of undue influence is
instructive. A hallmark of undue influence is that a testator
makes an “unnatural disposition.”322 As with testamentary
capacity, “unnaturalness” for the purposes of undue influence
generally means a bequest “to one who is not related by blood or
marriage.”323 But a parade of scholars has persuasively argued
that this rubric tends to cloud the legitimacy of wills that defy
societal norms.324 Likewise, using intestacy as the yardstick for
“natural objects” singles out testators who lack families, seek to
reward caregivers, or are involved in intimate partnerships.325
The relationship theory, in contrast, is more consistent with
the phrase “natural objects.” As noted, in the early nineteenth
century, the law asked whether the testator knew the “objects”
of her bounty,326 a concept that most courts understood to mean
321. See E. Gary Spitko, Gone but Not Conforming: Protecting the
Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through
Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 275 n.1 (1999).
Indeed, as one probate judge admitted, if “he and his colleagues . . . consider[]
the provisions in the instrument offensive, it is denied probate.” Edwin
Epstein, Testamentary Capacity, Reasonableness and Family Maintenance: A
Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 231, 240, 242 (1962).
322. In re Est. of Moretti, 871 N.E.2d 493, 502 (Mass. Ct. App. 2007).
323. In re Ingersoll Tr., 950 A.2d 672, 698 (D.C. 2008).
324. See Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Testamentary Gifts Resulting from
Meretricious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 200, 201 (1989) (observing that the undue influence
doctrine “often functions . . . as a barometer of society’s mores”); Ray D.
Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 576 (1997)
(arguing that “the undue influence doctrine denies freedom of testation for
people who deviate from judicially imposed testamentary norms”). Admittedly,
other commentators have also linked the pernicious impact of the “unnatural
disposition” element of undue influence to the “natural objects” prong of
incapacity. See Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law,
80 N.C. L. REV. 199, 210–11 (2001) (“Bequests to individuals other than
‘natural objects of the decedent’s bounty’—essentially family members—raise
judicial red flags, even when the beneficiary was the decedent’s dependent or
primary caregiver.”); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 243 (1996) (noting that courts apply an “implicit
presumption of invalidity where a will benefits non-relatives”).
325. See supra notes 318–319.
326. See Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589, 654 (1819), overruled in part by
Meeker v. Boylan, 28 N.J.L. 274 (1860) (“A man enfeebled by age or disease
must always be under the care, protection and government of somebody; this
somebody must generally be one of his children who lives with him . . . and
who will, almost necessarily, be one of the objects of his bounty . . . .”); Clarke
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her “immediate family.”327 Yet some courts struggled with fact
patterns where the testator had snubbed heirs who seemed
undeserving of an inheritance.328 The testator’s decision to
exclude estranged heirs may have been entirely rational and
yet, under the intestacy theory, the disinheritance of any heir
could be considered evidence of the testator’s incapacity.329 To
uphold these sensible-seeming wills, judges made a subtle
change to the test by inserting the word “natural” before
“objects” and therefore expanded the relevant class to “persons
who formed, for the testator, the emotional equivalent of a
family.”330 Accordingly, the “natural objects” rule was initially
designed to reject the intestacy theory and examine whether the
testator and the beneficiary “had developed a close and
affectionate relationship.”331 But while most jurisdictions later
included the language of “natural objects” in their test for
testamentary capacity, they did so without adopting the

v. Fisher, 1 Paige Ch. 171, 173 (N.Y. Ch. 1828) (“He must be of sound and
disposing mind and memory, so as to be capable of making a testamentary
disposition of his property with sense and judgment, in reference to . . . the
relative claims of the different persons who are or might be the objects of his
bounty.”).
327. Turner v. Cheesman, 15 N.J. Eq. 243, 243 (Prerog. Ct. 1857); Robert
E. Mensel, Right Feeling and Knowing Right: Insanity in Testators and
Criminals in Nineteenth Century American Law, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 397, 424
(2005) (“Derangement in this context was defined in counterpoint to the
idealization of the family underlying the cult of domesticity . . . .”).
328. See Mensel, supra note 327, at 426 (“Where members of the conjugal
family, or the nearest relatives, had behaved ‘unnaturally’ the courts plumbed
the record for a ‘family’ that served the emotional role of a conjugal family, and
identified the natural objects of bounty accordingly.”); cf. Susanna L.
Blumenthal, The Deviance of the Will: Policing the Bounds of Testamentary
Freedom in Nineteenth-Century America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 959, 1032–33
(2006) (explaining how judges during this time were torn between respecting
individual autonomy and striking down wills that “deviated from the norms of
‘natural justice’”).
329. See Blumenthal, supra note 328, at 971 (“[T]hose deemed competent
to make a will remained subject to various restraints on their power to dispose
of their property. . . . [A] few [states] refused to give effect to ‘inofficious’ wills
absent clear proof of the testator’s intent to disinherit his offspring . . . .”).
330. Mensel, supra note 327, at 424.
331. Reddoch v. Blair, 688 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Ark. 1985) (“A will cannot be
said to be unnatural because a testator preferred one for whom she had
developed a close and affectionate relationship . . . .” (quoting Abel v.
Dickinson, 467 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Ark. 1971))).
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relationship theory on which that language is predicated.332
Thus, in most jurisdictions today, the “natural objects” prong of
testamentary capacity refers—illogically, in our view—to the
testator’s intestate heirs rather than to persons with whom the
testator actually maintained close relationships during life
regardless of familial status.
This is not to say that the relationship theory is perfect. One
of its most glaring deficiencies is its amorphousness.333 Indeed,
it requires a posthumously assembled jury to decide what a
rational testator should have done with her estate. As such, it
indulges in the heroic assumption that strangers can peer back
through time and analyze “the respective relative standings of
the beneficiary and the contestant to the decedent.”334 As a
result, critics argue that it is “infinitely more vague than the
standard of the hypothetical ‘reasonably prudent man’ in
negligence cases.”335
To address this concern, courts should follow the
relationship theory but impose a heightened burden of proof.
The “unnaturalness” of a will should only matter when there is

332. See supra notes 312–313 and accompanying text.
333. See Susan N. Gary, Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families,
18 L. & INEQ. 1, 41 (2000) (“[T]he court must determine actual family
ties— rather than make a distribution based simply on blood or other legal
ties.”).
334. In re Est. of Sarabia, 270 Cal. Rptr. 560, 564, 609 (Ct. App. 1990)
(adopting this standard to define “undu[e] profit[]” in undue influence cases).
In addition, giving courts discretion to decide who the testator should have
preferred may also “create problems for persons whose behavior and family
structure do not fit the prevailing social norms.” Gary, supra note 333, at 70.
Yet this danger may be less acute given recent societal changes that are more
accepting of diverse family structures and romantic relationships. See June
Carbone, A Consumer Guide to Empirical Family Law, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1593, 1597 (2020).
335. Green, Judicial Tests, supra note 39, at 165. At the same time,
though, the intestacy theory suffers from a similar flaw. Some jurisdictions
that subscribe to the intestacy theory define natural objects as the
“descendants, surviving spouse, and parents of the testator.” In re Nolan’s Est.,
78 P.2d 456, 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 1938). Under this interpretation, natural
objects do not include “[n]ephews, nieces, brothers, sisters, and other collateral
heirs.” Stormon v. Weiss, 65 N.W.2d 475, 505 (N.D. 1954) (quotation omitted).
Yet other judges include cousins as natural objects, although they admit that
their status is “not as formidable” as other relatives. In re McCarty’s Will, 126
N.Y.S. 699, 702–03 (App. Div. 1910). Thus, in its own way, the intestacy theory
is ill-defined and open-ended.
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clear and convincing evidence that the testator was not capable
of identifying her closest relationships or loved ones at the time
of will execution. To prevail, a contestant should have to prove
the existence of a close relationship to the testator and the
testator’s inability to recognize the existence of that relationship
when she executed the will.
To illustrate this standard more concretely, suppose that a
testator had instructed her lawyer to draft a will that left
everything to her then-current boyfriend and nothing to her
children from a prior marriage. Suppose further that, when
asked by the attorney why she wanted to disinherit her children,
the testator stated that she had not seen her children in years
and they had all but abandoned her. If the testator’s stated
reasons for disinheriting her children were factually true, then
the boyfriend would, in fact, be the natural object of the
testator’s bounty and the will would not be set aside for lack of
testamentary capacity. If, however, the testator’s stated reasons
were not true such that the testator’s children could prove by
clear and convincing evidence that, contrary to the testator’s
representation to her attorney, they had continued to visit and
communicate with the testator, then such evidence would
rightly call into question the testator’s capacity to understand
the legal consequences of the estate plan memorialized in her
will. The will could then be set aside on grounds of incapacity.
Contestants would not prevail under the relationship theory
merely by proving that the boyfriend was not an intestate heir
or that an objectively rational testator would not have
disinherited her children. Rather, contestants would prevail by
proving clearly and convincingly (1) the existence of a close
relationship and (2) the testator’s inability to cognize the
existence of that relationship at the time of will execution.
Thus, the relationship theory would abolish the formalism
of the intestacy theory while minimizing the risk of judges
second-guessing a testator’s dispositive choices by subjecting
proof of incapacity to the clear and convincing evidence
standard. The relationship theory would also reinforce the value
of independent legal advice in the estate planning process and
underscore the need for attorneys to thoroughly discuss the
testator’s reasons for selecting each will beneficiary or, as
relevant, the reasons for excluding individuals who might expect
to inherit from the testator.
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Finally, states could easily implement this proposal. As we
mentioned above, some jurisdictions already require the
contestant to demonstrate incapacity by clear and convincing
evidence.336 Thus, lawmakers or courts in these regions would
only need to adopt the relationship theory. Alternatively, other
states could either switch to a clear and convincing standard for
each element of the incapacity test—a change that would align
testamentary capacity with the standard of proof in
guardianship cases337—or simply raise the bar for the “natural
objects” component.
2.

Capacity and Nonprobate Transfers

Lawmakers and courts are also divided over which capacity
test governs nonprobate instruments.338 This section contends
that will substitutes should trigger the rule for testamentary
capacity.
The confusion about capacity and nonprobate transfers
exists on two levels. At the most basic level, jurisdictions
disagree about which capacity rule applies to certain types of
transfers. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and
some courts use contractual capacity to assess all trusts.339
However, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the Uniform Trust
Code, and many states relax the standard to testamentary
capacity for revocable trusts.340
But this divergence also goes deeper. Traditionally, courts
calibrated the capacity yardstick by focusing on the type of

336. See supra notes 131–134 and accompanying text.
337. See supra note 86.
338. See supra notes 135–139 and accompanying text.
339. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 22 (AM. L. INST. 1959) (“A
person has capacity to create a trust by making a promise to another person
whose rights against the promisor are to be held in trust for a third person, to
the extent that he has capacity to make a contract.”); see also supra note 139
and accompanying text.
340. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 11(3) (AM. L. INST. 2003); UNIF.
TRUST CODE § 601 (UNIF. L. COMM’N 2000) (amended 2010) (“The capacity
required to create, amend, revoke, or add property to a revocable trust, or to
direct the actions of the trustee of a revocable trust, is the same as that
required to make a will.”); Trust Code, UNIF. L. COMM’N (2022),
https://perma.cc/FVX2-N7DC (showing that the UTC has been widely
enacted).
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transfer (the “formalist” approach).341 A good illustration is Ivie
v. Smith,342 a Missouri Supreme Court decision. Patricia
Watson, who suffered from Alzheimer’s dementia, amended her
revocable trust and the beneficiary designations on her
pay-on-death accounts.343 The state high court analyzed each of
these acts differently.344 On the one hand, the court explained
that “[t]he capacity required to make or amend a revocable trust
is the same as that required to make a will—‘testamentary
capacity.’”345 On the other hand, the court held that “changes to
beneficiary designations are matters of contract” and therefore
trigger “the standard for contractual capacity, not the standard
for testamentary capacity.”346 Accordingly, under the formalist
approach, the species of the conveyance dictates the appropriate
test.
Lately, though, some jurisdictions have started considering
the substantive complexity of the contested transaction rather
than the form (the “transactional complexity” approach).347 For
example, in Andersen v. Hunt,348 Wayne Andersen suffered a
stroke and then amended his revocable trust to leave his
partner, Pauline Hunt, 60 percent of his assets.349 A California
trial court invalidated the revision under the rule for
contractual capacity.350 An appellate panel reversed, reasoning
that capacity “must be evaluated by a person’s ability to
appreciate the consequences of the particular act he or she

341. See Mary F. Radford, “Sufficient” Capacity: The Contrasting Capacity
Requirements for Different Documents, 2 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATT’YS J. 303,
304 (2006) (“Different actions require different levels of mental capacity.”).
342. 439 S.W.3d 189 (Mo. 2014).
343. Id. at 195–97.
344. Id. at 200–05.
345. Id. at 200.
346. Id. at 205.
347. See Ware v. Ware, 161 P.3d 1188, 1193 (Alaska 2007) (applying the
testamentary capacity standard to a gift); Maimonides Sch. v. Coles, 881
N.E.2d 778, 788 (Mass. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming the trial court for using “the
standard for testamentary capacity and not the more demanding test for
contractual capacity” when the decedent’s “trust instruments were not
complex, even though they disposed of property worth millions of dollars”).
348. 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 736 (Ct. App. 2011).
349. Id. at 738.
350. Id.
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wishes to take.”351 Because Andersen’s amendment was
simple—indeed, it merely changed Hunt’s share of the
estate—the court held that it was “indistinguishable from a will
or codicil,” and enforced it under the lower threshold for
testamentary capacity.352 Conversely, in Lintz v. Lintz,353
another California appellate court analyzed an amendment to a
revocable trust under contract law.354 Robert Lintz executed two
revocable trusts and more than ten amendments to them.355 The
court of appeals reasoned that these instruments, despite being
revocable will substitutes, addressed community property and
estate tax issues that “were unquestionably more complex than
a will or codicil.”356 Therefore, the transactional complexity
approach goes beyond labels by linking the capacity rule to the
sophistication of a particular device. A downside of this
approach is that the transferor cannot ascertain with certainty
which capacity standard will apply to a prospective transaction
because the determination of complexity is not made by a court
until after the transferor’s death.357
Ideally, states would find middle ground by applying
testamentary capacity to all will substitutes (the “hybrid”
approach).358 Doing so would combine the benefits of the
formalist and the transactional complexity approaches. For
starters, borrowing the bright lines of the formalist approach
would promote clarity and, in turn, cure the transactional
complexity approach’s biggest flaw.359 In a setting like estate
planning, a categorical rule is superior to a muddy standard that
forces the parties to guess what the law is. The hybrid approach

351. Id. at 742 (emphasis omitted).
352. Id.
353. 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 50 (Ct. App. 2014).
354. Id. at 54–55.
355. Id. at 53–54.
356. Id. at 55.
357. See id.
358. By “will substitutes,” we mean “revocable inter vivos trusts, life
insurance, pension and employee-benefit accounts, multiple-party accounts
with banks and other financial intermediaries, payable- or transfer-on-death
arrangements, joint ownership with right of survivorship, and annuities with
death benefits.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 7.1 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2003).
359. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
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would then expand the application of the testamentary capacity
standard to all transfers that fall into the category of revocable
will substitutes. Unfortunately, even though the Restatement
endorses the categorical application of testamentary capacity to
all revocable will substitutes,360 many formalist jurisdictions
still subject some types of will substitutes to contractual
capacity.361 Like transactional complexity states, the hybrid
approach would recognize the folly in this perspective. As noted,
the rationale for demanding a higher degree of mental acuity for
contracts is that transferors can harm themselves by making
poor decisions.362 Yet when a person executes a will substitute,
she retains “substantial lifetime rights of dominion, control,

360. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1(b) (AM. L. INST. 2003)
If the donative transfer is in the form of a will, a revocable will
substitute, or a revocable gift, the testator or donor must be capable
of knowing and understanding in a general way the nature and
extent of his or her property, the natural objects of his or her
bounty, and the disposition that he or she is making of that
property, and must also be capable of relating these elements to one
another and forming an orderly desire regarding the disposition of
the property.
361. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (collecting authority that
uses contractual capacity for revocable trusts); SunTrust Bank, Middle Ga.
N.A. v. Harper, 551 S.E.2d 419, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“Because [the
decedent] no longer had the power to contract, we find that he no longer had
the power to modify the contractual terms of the IRA by changing the
beneficiary.”); In re Est. of Marquis, 822 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Me. 2003) (“[A] party
to an annuity contract must possess the mental capacity necessary for
executing a valid contract—and not that required to execute or amend a
will— when changing the beneficiary designation on an annuity policy.”);
Netherton v. Netherton, 593 S.W.3d 654, 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 2019) (“The
capacity required to make a beneficiary designation is contractual capacity,
which is a higher standard than testamentary capacity.”); Rawlings v. John
Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 296 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001)
(“[C]hanging a beneficiary requires the same mental capacity as executing a
valid contract.”); Hilbert v. Benson, 917 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Wyo. 1996) (“[A]
higher degree of mental capacity is required to execute an inter vivos
conveyance or contract or to transact business generally, than is required in
executing a will.”). But see Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Huizenga, No.
CV-18-08320, 2020 WL 6891415, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 24, 2020) (employing the
rule for testamentary capacity when analyzing a change to life insurance
benefits).
362. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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possession, or enjoyment.”363 Accordingly, there is less risk that
a revocable trust or change in beneficiary designations will
cause hardship to the property owner during life. Thus, applying
the contractual capacity rule to revocable will substitutes
imposes an unnecessarily stringent standard of mental acuity
for transactions that are, in practice, aspects of estate planning
rather than lifetime contracts.
Finally, the hybrid approach would pay practical dividends.
Individuals often execute an “integrated” estate plan that
consists of a revocable inter vivos trust (the centerpiece of their
estate plan) and a “pour-over” will (which “pours” any remaining
property in the probate estate into the trust).364 Yet recall that
in some formalist states and all transactional complexity
jurisdictions, contractual capacity might govern the trust.365 In
turn, if a decedent possessed testamentary capacity but not
contractual capacity, a court would uphold the will but
invalidate the trust. This would nullify the decedent’s
testamentary scheme: indeed, the will would transmit assets to
a trust that does not exist.366 The hybrid approach would avoid
this perverse outcome by ensuring that each element of the
integrated estate plan rises or falls together.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored an anomaly in the regulation of
people with CIDD. Courts often must decide whether an owner
possesses the mental fitness to control her property. When the
question is whether to impose a guardianship, states try to
ensure that the respondent participates in the hearing and

363. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 7.1(a) (AM. L. INST. 1979).
364. See Maimonides Sch. v. Coles, 881 N.E.2d 778, 788 (Mass. Ct. App.
2008)
365. See supra notes 139, 353–357 and accompanying text.
366. See Maimonides Sch., 881 N.E.2d at 788 (assessing an amendment to
a trust under the testamentary capacity doctrine because “[t]he use of one
standard for mental capacity to execute a pour-over will and another standard
to execute a simultaneous revocable inter vivos trust would unnecessarily and
impractically risk inconsistent results”); Robert Whitman, Capacity for
Lifetime and Estate Planning, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2013)
(suggesting that the law “consider[s] adopting a new unitary standard for
mental capacity”).
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forfeits as few rights as possible. But if the issue is the validity
of a will, this rubric inverts. Testators must overcome
bright-line rules against persons under guardianship executing
wills or delegating the task to a guardian or agent. Moreover, in
almost every American jurisdiction, testators have no
opportunity to personally respond to allegations of mental
incapacitation. By abolishing these hurdles, enacting living
probate regimes, and clarifying the testamentary capacity
standard, the legal system would embrace the modern SDM
trend of disability rights law and empower individuals who were
once dismissed as “lunatics” and “idiots” to wield “one of the
most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property.”367

367. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)).

